concluding that "the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no disturbance or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred," even though the students "caused discussion outside of the classrooms" (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- concluding that "the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no disturbance or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred," even though the students "caused discussion outside of the classrooms" (emphasis added)
- holding that the Des Moines School District could not punish high-school and junior high-school students for wearing black arm bands to school in protest of the Vietnam war where the students merely caused discussion outside the classrooms and neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in the school’s affairs or the lives of others
- stating that "in some precisely delineated areas, a child -- like someone in a captive audience -- is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." (emphasis added) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment))
- holding that students have the right to express their opinions, even on controversial topics, if they do so “without ‘materially and substantially interfer(ing) with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of others” (internal citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412 (2003)
The significance of age in this inquiry has called into question the appropriateness of employing the Tinker framework to assess the constitutionality of restrictions on the expression of elementary school students.
Questioned by Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412 (2003)
The significance of age in this inquiry has called into question the appropriateness of employing the Tinker framework to assess the constitutionality of restrictions on the expression of elementary school students.
Declined to follow by Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 2012 Minn. LEXIS 246 (2012)
Even though courts have applied Tinker to speech originating off campus that reaches the attention of school authorities, at least in the K-12 setting, we decline to apply the Tinker substantial disruption standard to Tatro’s Facebook posts.5 The Tinker substantial disruption standard
Disagreed with by Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242 (1992)
In addition to finding the rules valid under the reasonableness test we are applying, we disagree with the district court’s statement that, under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, and Groyned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), the Library may only enact time, place and manner restrictions on activity that "actually and…
Distinguished
Distinguished by Leal v. Everett Public Schools, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1220 (2015)
Defendants argue that Tinker is inapplicable to plaintiffs facial challenge of the policy because unlike the present case, Tinker addressed a viewpoint-discriminatory policy.
Distinguished by Webber v. First Student, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (2013)
Thus, a reasonable official in Bergreen’s position would know that Tinker is inapplicable here because Webber is an employee, not a student, and, as the District itself has pointed out, Webber’s flag is expressive activity, not “pure speech.”
Distinguished by LoPresti v. GALLOWAY TP. MIDDLE SCH., 381 N.J. Super. 314 (2004)
The facts of Tinker are distinguishable from the instant case in that the students in Tinker were prohibited from expressing a particular opinion about the Vietnam war through the symbolic act of wearing black armbands.
Distinguished by Berner v. Delahanty, 937 F. Supp. 62 (1996)
Tinker, however, is distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
dissenting.
I certainly agree that state public school authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities are not wholly exempt from the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment respecting the freedoms of expression and association. At the same time I am reluctant to believe that there is any disagreement between the majority and myself on the proposition that school officials should be accorded the widest authority in maintaining discipline and good order in their institutions. To translate that proposition into a workable constitutional rule, I would, in cases like this, east upon those complaining the burden of showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other than legitimate school concerns — for example, a desire to prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, while permitting expression of the dominant opinion.
Finding nothing in this record which impugns the good faith of respondents in promulgating the armband regulation, I would affirm the judgment below.