finding that Georgia’s “departure-from-doctrine” test violated the First Amendment by requiring “the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion” to determine whether an implied trust had been formed where the appellee churchmen immediately challenged a PCUSA Administrative Commission’s action in civil court without appealing the “decision by a to higher church tribunals—the Synod of Georgia or the [PCUSA] General Assembly”
How later courts described this case
- finding that Georgia’s “departure-from-doctrine” test violated the First Amendment by requiring “the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion” to determine whether an implied trust had been formed where the appellee churchmen immediately challenged a PCUSA Administrative Commission’s action in civil court without appealing the “decision by a to higher church tribunals—the Synod of Georgia or the [PCUSA] General Assembly”
- recognizing that "not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment"; and "[c]ivil courts to not inhibit the free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property" and applying neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes
- finding that dispute arose out of controversy concerning church doctrine and Georgia courts impermissibly determined whether actions of general church constituted a “substantial departure” from prior doctrine and whether the issue on which the general church departed held a place of such importance in the traditional theology as to require termination of the trust
- holding that if intrachurch property dispute required interpreting and weighing church doctrine, a court could not intervene; if, however, neutral principles of law could be applied without determining underlying question of religious doctrine and practice, a court could intervene
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
I am in entire agreement with the Court’s rejection of the “departure-from-doctrine” approach taken by the Georgia courts, as that approach necessarily requires the civilian courts to weigh the significance and the meaning of disputed religious doctrine. I do not, however, read the Court’s opinion to go further to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids civilian courts from enforcing a deed or will which expressly and clearly lays down conditions limiting a religious organization’s use of the property which is granted. If, for example, the donor expressly gives his church some money on the condition that the church never ordain a woman as a minister or elder, see ante, at 442, n. 1, or never amend certain specified articles of the Confession of Faith, he is entitled to his money back if the condition is not fulfilled. In such a case, the church should not be permitted to keep the property simply because church authorities have determined that the doctrinal innovation is justified by the faith’s basic principles. Cf. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 722-724 (1872).
On this understanding, I join the Court’s opinion.