holding that states are under "a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort” to acquire the presence of a defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction in order to comport with the constitutional requirement of a speedy trial
How later courts described this case
- holding that states are under "a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort” to acquire the presence of a defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction in order to comport with the constitutional requirement of a speedy trial
- explaining that the accused’s ability to defend himself while incarcerated is hampered because “his ability to confer with potential defense witnesses, or even to keep track of their whereabouts, is obviously impaired”
- holding the State had a constitutional duty, upon request of federal prisoner that he be brought to trial on a state charge, to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him before state court for trial
- holding that where a defendant in federal custody in another state demands a speedy trial on state criminal charges, the state must make diligent, good-faith efforts to secure his presence for trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gaches v. THIRD JUDICIAL DIST., ETC., STATE OF UTAH, 416 F. Supp. 767 (1976)
393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969) relied upon by the petitioner is clearly distinguishable for in that case the petitioner had not been found guilty of the State charge.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black
concurs in the opinion and judgment of the Court, but he would make it absolutely clear to the Supreme Court of Texas that so far as the federal constitutional question is concerned its judgment is set aside only for the purpose of giving the petitioner a trial, and that if a trial is given the case should not be dismissed.
Separate opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan.
I agree that a State may not ignore a criminal accused’s request to be brought to trial, merely because he is incarcerated in another jurisdiction, but that it must make a reasonable effort to secure his presence for trial. This much is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and I would rest decision of this case on that ground, and not on “incorporation” of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy-trial provision into the Pour- *384 teenth. See my opinion concurring in the result in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213, 226 (1967).
I believe, however, that the State is entitled to more explicitness from us as to what is to be expected of it on remand than what is conveyed merely by the requirement that further proceedings not be “inconsistent with this opinion.” Must the charges against petitioner be dismissed? Or may Texas now secure his presence and proceed to try him? If petitioner contends that he has been prejudiced by the nine-year delay, how is this claim to be adjudicated?
This case is one of first impression for us, and decides a question on which the state and lower federal courts have been divided. Under these particular circumstances, I do not believe that Texas should automatically forfeit the right to try petitioner. If the State still desires to bring him to trial, it should do so forthwith. At trial, if petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he has in fact been prejudiced by the State’s delay, I would then shift to the State the burden of proving the contrary.