holding that even though Housing Authority had already instituted eviction proceedings against a tenant and therefore could not comply literally with a subsequently-promulgated HUD rule requiring that “before instituting an eviction proceeding local housing authorities ... [must] inform the tenant ‘in a private conference or other appropriate manner’ of the reasons for the eviction and give him ‘an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he may wish,’ ” Housing Authority was required, before proceeding further with eviction efforts, to afford the tenant the notice and opportunity to reply specified in the new regulation, which was “designed to insure a fairer eviction procedure in general”
How later courts described this case
- holding that even though Housing Authority had already instituted eviction proceedings against a tenant and therefore could not comply literally with a subsequently-promulgated HUD rule requiring that “before instituting an eviction proceeding local housing authorities ... [must] inform the tenant ‘in a private conference or other appropriate manner’ of the reasons for the eviction and give him ‘an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he may wish,’ ” Housing Authority was required, before proceeding further with eviction efforts, to afford the tenant the notice and opportunity to reply specified in the new regulation, which was “designed to insure a fairer eviction procedure in general”
- explaining that, in contrast to the Low-Rent Management Manual and circulars containing changes not yet incorporated into the Manual which contain requirements that “are the minimum considered consistent with fulfilling Federal responsibilities” under the United States Housing Act of 1937, “the various ‘handbooks’ and ‘booklets’ issued by HUD contain mere ‘instructions,’ ‘technical suggestions,’ and ‘items for consideration.”
- concluding that a new agency policy imposing "a very simple notification procedure" that a housing authority had to follow prior to evicting a tenant, which did not alter the lease terms or take away the housing authority's legal ability to evict, was applicable to an eviction proceeding commenced before the policy was issued but not yet completed
- holding that a HUD circular — requiring notice of reasons for eviction be given to tenants in HUD-assisted housing projects — would apply to the eviction of a tenant whose judicial challenge to the eviction was pending at the time of the circular’s issuance
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by US West Communications, Inc. v. AT & T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (1999)
393 U.S. 268, 282, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969), is inapposite as well.
Distinguished by MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. GTE Northwest, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (1999)
393 U.S. 268, 282, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969), is inapposite as well.
Distinguished by Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692 (1982)
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969), relied on by appellees, is distinguishable.
The opinion
Me. Justice Black,
concurring.
The Court here uses a cannon to dispose of a case that calls for no more than a popgun. The Durham Housing *285 Authority has clearly stated, both in its brief and at oral argument, that it is fully complying with the directive of the Department of Housing and Urban Development concerning notice to tenants of reasons for their eviction. The only possible issue therefore is whether the directive should apply to Mrs. Thorpe, against whom eviction proceedings were started prior to the effective date of the HUD memorandum but who is still residing in public housing, as a result of judicial stays. I agree, of course, that the directive should apply to her eviction. Nothing else need be decided.