recognizing “a place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice, of temporary restraining orders of short duration” but not “where no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to participate”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing “a place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice, of temporary restraining orders of short duration” but not “where no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to participate”
- recognizing that "[t]here is a place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice, of temporary __ restraining orders of short duration"
- holding that a ten-day restraining order against demonstrations was capable of repetition and always likely to evade review because litigation would be completed before the ten days expired
- noting that the Court need not decide the "thorny" problem of whether an injunction against a white supremacist organization's rally could be justified based on findings that the organization had engaged in unprotected conduct at a prior rally because the injunction could be invalidated on the narrower ground that it was issued ex parte without notice or an opportunity to be heard
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United Steelworkers of Amer. v. Alabaster Lime Co., 286 Ala. 489 (1970)
We think Carroll, supra, is distinguishable.
The opinion
Mu. Justice Douglas,
while joining the opinion of the Court, adheres to his dissent in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 446-447 , and to his concurring opinion in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 61-62 .