recognizing that although “the Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific power[s] ... these granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that although “the Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific power[s] ... these granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution”
- holding that " 'invidious' distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,” and that Ohio's laws limiting the ability of political parties to appear on the ballot constitute "an invidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”
- concluding that "under the circumstances," Ohio would be required to print the name of the Ohio American Independent Party on the ballot, but the Socialist Labor Party would be limited to the relief previously granted, namely space on the ballot for write-in votes
- stating that the extensive powers granted to the states to pass laws regulating the selection of electors is subject to the limitation that these powers “may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by LaRouche v. Kezer, 787 F. Supp. 298 (1992)
393 U.S. 23, 34, 89 S.Ct. 5, 12, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968), is inapplicable where a candidate is not “absolutely and validly barred from the ballot by one provision of the laws.”
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
dissenting in No. 643 and concurring in No. 544.
I agree with much of what my Brother Stewart says in his dissenting opinion in No. 543. In my view, neither *62 the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits Ohio from requiring that the appointment of presidential electors be carried out through the political party process. The Court does not hold that Ohio must accord ballot position to those who are unwilling to work through the framework of an established or nascent political party, nor do I understand appellants to make this contention. In this connection, there is no suggestion in the majority opinion that Ohio, merely by requiring potential candidates to participate in a primary, has acted unreasonably. Indeed, this requirement provides the opportunity for the presentation and winnowing out of candidates which is surely a legitimate objective of state policy. Nor is it held that Ohio’s requirement, pursuant to this objective, that parties must show their base of popular support by obtaining the signatures of 16% of Ohio’s gubernatorial voters is itself unreasonable.
In the face of such requirements, which neither alone nor in combination are unconstitutional, I do not understand how the American Independent Party may be ordered on the ballot over the objections of the State. The Independent Party has not complied with the provision that it show a sufficient base of popular support in time for participation in a primary. Indeed, the Party made no effort whatsoever to comply with these provisions. It claims it secured the necessary number of signatures but admits it wholly ignored the requirement that the petitions be filed prior to the primary election date. Had it filed them, and been denied participation in the primary or the election for failure to meet some other requirement, the case would be very different. But it did not even commence judicial challenge of the signature requirement, not to mention gathering signatures, in time to participate in the primary. The Independent Party is in no position to complain that it would have been impos *63 sible for its members to gather the necessary signatures— which they were in fact able to assemble subsequently— or that it might in its progress toward ballot position have encountered some later obstacle.
That other Ohio provisions related to later phases of the election process might have imposed unconstitutional barriers to ballot position is no reason to excuse the Independent Party from complying with those preconditions which the State may validly impose. Why a majority of the Court insists on holding the primary petition requirement impermissible, not on its own demerits, but because it appears in the statute books with more questionable provisions is the major mystery of the majority position. Neither the Independent nor the Socialist Labor Party is entitled to relief in this Court.