holding that in a case “in which a teacher has made erroneous public statements upon issues then currently the subject of public attention, which are critical of his-ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally,” the government failed to show that its interests outweighed the teacher’s interest in speaking
How later courts described this case
- holding that in a case “in which a teacher has made erroneous public statements upon issues then currently the subject of public attention, which are critical of his-ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally,” the government failed to show that its interests outweighed the teacher’s interest in speaking
- finding that discharge violated First Amendment where there was “no evidence” to support defendant’s allegations that teacher’s publication of letter criticizing school funding policy “damaged the professional reputations of the Board and the superintendent and would foment controversy and conflict among the Board, teachers, administrators, and the residents of the district”
- holding that a “difference of opinion” concerning “the preferable manner of operating the school system” is a matter of public concern, as it related to the school board’s allocation of funds between education and athletic programs and the “methods of informing, or preventing the informing of, the district’s taxpayers” about the reasons additional funds were needed
- holding that the scope of a government employee's First Amendment rights depends on the "balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (1985)
But we disagree with the district court’s further assessment that in the Pickering calculus, Berger’s artistic expression should not be viewed “as particularly important, or worthy of a great deal of protection.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Albert Burnham v. Lawrence Ianni, 119 F.3d 668 (1997)
We not only find that the Pickering balancing test is inapposite under these facts, but we also disagree with Ianni’s analysis of qualified immunity law.
Distinguished by Evelyn Anderson v. David Evans, 660 F.2d 153 (1981)
Also, unlike Pickering, this case is one where the nature of the employee’s remarks cast serious doubt on her judgment and general competence as a teacher.
Distinguished by Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770 (1979)
Pickering and the cases it cited are distinguishable from the instant case because they involved Supreme Court review of state administrative and state court findings, as opposed to the federal court review of federal administrative findings in this case.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Court holds that truthful statements by a school teacher critical of the school board are within the ambit of the First Amendment. So also are false statements innocently or negligently made. The State may not fire the teacher for making either unless, as I gather it, there are special circumstances, not present in this case, demonstrating an overriding state interest, such as the need for confidentiality or the special obligations which a teacher in a particular position may owe to his superiors. 1 *583 The core of today’s decision is the holding that Pickering’s discharge must be tested by the standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). To this extent I am in agreement.
The Court goes on, however, to reopen a question I had thought settled by New York Times and the cases that followed it, particularly Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964). The Court devotes several pages to reexamining the facts in order to reject the determination below that Pickering’s statements harmed the school system, ante, at 570-573, when the question of harm is clearly irrelevant given the Court’s determination that Pickering’s statements were neither knowingly nor recklessly false and its ruling that in such circumstances a teacher may not be fired even if the statements are injurious. The Court then gratuitously suggests that when statements are found to be knowingly or recklessly false, it is an open question whether the First Amendment still protects them unless they are shown or can be presumed to have caused harm. Ante, at 574, n. 6. Deliberate or reckless falsehoods serve no First Amendment ends and deserve no protection under that Amendment. The Court unequivocally recognized this in Garrison , where after reargument the Court said that “the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.” 379 U. S., at 75 . The Court today neither *584 explains nor justifies its withdrawal from the firm stand taken in Garrison . As I see it, a teacher may be fired without violation of the First Amendment for knowingly or recklessly making false statements regardless of their harmful impact on the schools. As the Court holds, however, in the absence of special circumstances he may not be fired if his statements were true or only negligently false, even if there is some harm to the school system. I therefore see no basis or necessity for the Court’s foray into fact-finding with respect to whether the record supports a finding as to injury. 2 If Pickering’s false statements were either knowingly or recklessly made, injury to the school system becomes irrelevant, and the First Amendment would not prevent his discharge. For the State to be constitutionally precluded from terminating his employment, reliance on some other constitutional provision would be required.
Nor can I join the Court in its findings with regard to whether Pickering knowingly or recklessly published false statements. Neither the State in presenting its evidence nor the state tribunals in arriving at their findings and conclusions of law addressed themselves to the elements of the new standard which the Court holds the First Amendment to require in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, the state courts expressly rejected the applicability of both New York Times and Garrison . I find it wholly unsatisfactory for this Court to make the initial determination of knowing or reckless falsehood from the cold record now before us. It would be far more appropriate to remand this case to the state courts for further proceedings in light of the constitutional standard which the Court deems applicable to this case, once the relevant facts have been ascertained in appropriate proceedings.
See ante, at 569-570, 572 and nn. 3, 4. The Court does not elaborate upon its suggestion that there may be situations in which, with *583 reference to certain areas of public comment, a teacher may have special obligations to his superiors. It simply holds that in this case, with respect to the particular public comment made by Pickering, he is more like a member of the general public and, apparently, too remote from the school board to require placing him into any special category. Further, as I read the Court’s opinion, it does not foreclose the possibility that under the First Amendment a school system may have an enforceable rule, applicable to teachers, that public statements about school business must first be submitted to the authorities to check for accuracy.
Even if consideration of harm were necessary in this case, I could not join the Court in concluding on this record that harm to the school administration was not proved and could not be presumed.