stating that defendants in criminal contempt proceedings “must be presumed innocent, proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, [] accorded the right to refuse to testify against themselves, [] advised of charges, have a reasonable opportunity to respond to them, [] permitted the assistance of counsel and the right to call witnesses, [] given a public trial before an unbiased judge, and [] be afforded a jury trial for serious contempts.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that defendants in criminal contempt proceedings “must be presumed innocent, proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, [] accorded the right to refuse to testify against themselves, [] advised of charges, have a reasonable opportunity to respond to them, [] permitted the assistance of counsel and the right to call witnesses, [] given a public trial before an unbiased judge, and [] be afforded a jury trial for serious contempts.”
- holding that an alleged contemnor “is not entitled to be prosecuted by indictment on a criminal contempt charge.”
- recognizing “a strong temptation to make exception to the rule we establish today for disorders in the court room” but deciding that “no special rule is needed” because the right to a jury trial “do[es] not apply to petty offenses”
- recognizing and placing limits on "the inherent power of courts to punish summarily for contempt."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Wilson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 312 (1972)
Although binding upon us, Bloom is inapplicable in that it imposes the requirement of a jury trial in contempt matters involving punish
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, ante, p. 171, and in my separate opinion in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U. S. 373, 380 . See also United States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681 ; Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165 .
This case completes a remarkable circle. In Duncan, supra, the Court imposed on the States a rule of procedure that was neither shown to be fundamental to procedural fairness nor held to be part of the originally understood content of the Fourteenth Amendment. The sole justification was that the rule was found in the Bill of Rights. The Court now, without stating any additional reasons, imposes on the States a related rule that, as recently as Cheff v. Schnackenberg, supra, the Court declined to find in the Bill of Rights. That the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, * inveighing against a century of “unconstitutional assumption of [state] powers by the Courts of the United States” in derogation of the central premise of our Constitution, should be invoked to support. the Court's action here can only be put down to the vagaries of the times.
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 532 , at 533 (dissenting opinion, quoted ante, at 198).