explaining that, unlike cross-examination outside of trial, the presence of the witness at trial compels the witness “to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, unlike cross-examination outside of trial, the presence of the witness at trial compels the witness “to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief”
- holding that Barber's failure to cross-examine a witness at a preliminary hearing did not constitute a waiver of his right to confrontation because Barber could not have anticipated that the witness would be unavailable to testify at trial
- holding that the prosecution failed to make a good faith effort to procure a witness for trial where it made no effort to avail itself of either a statutory provision or agency rule allowing for federal prisoners to testify in state courts
- holding that admission 12 of prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because the state did not prove the witness was unavailable irrespective of 13 whether the witness was cross-examined during prior testimony
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) — not on the Supreme Court's list
390 U.S. 719, 722, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).
Supreme Court of the United StatesMar 8, 20044 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Steeps, 52 A.D.2d 887 (1976)
I further believe that Barber v Page (390 US 719) is inapplicable.
Distinguished by State v. Ghoram, 328 So. 2d 91 (1976)
As in Dotch, the right of cross-examination was exercised at the earlier trial; consequently, defendant's right of confrontation was not violated.Barber, relied upon by defendant, is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
Distinguished by United States v. Frank F. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1 (1975)
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), upon which appellant relies, is distinguishable.
Distinguished by Davidson v. Commonwealth, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 183 (1968)
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, relied on by appellant, is distinguishable as follows:
The opinion
MR. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
I agree that the State’s failure to attempt to obtain the presence of the witness denied petitioner due process, and I therefore concur in the opinion of the Court on the premises of my opinion in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 408 .