determining that attorney “had no notice that his employment of [an individual] would be considered a disbarment offense until after both he and [the individual] had testified at length on all the material facts pertaining to this phase of the case”
How later courts described this case
- determining that attorney “had no notice that his employment of [an individual] would be considered a disbarment offense until after both he and [the individual] had testified at length on all the material facts pertaining to this phase of the case”
- holding that an attorney subject to discipline is entitled to procedural due process
- holding that an "absence of fair *989notice" in disbarment proceedings violated lawyer's due process rights where additional charges were filed against him after he had testified as to material facts regarding that charge
- holding that an "absence of fair notice" in disbarment proceedings violated lawyer's due process rights where additional charges were filed against him after he had testified as to material facts regarding that charge
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Inquiry Into the CONDUCT OF the Honorable Alan F. PENDLETON, 2015 Minn. LEXIS 577 (2015)
Ruffalo is distinguishable because it did not involve the investigatory phase of a disciplinary proceeding; instead, Ruffalo involved testimony given during the hearing on the charges after the disciplinary proceedings had begun.
Distinguished by In re the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 160 Wash. 2d 317 (2007)
¶46 To the extent that Marshall attempts to equate this case with the due process violation discussed in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968), that case is distinguishable.
Distinguished by Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 157 P.3d 859 (2007)
¶ 45 To the extent that Marshall attempts to equate this case with the due process violation discussed in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), that case is distinguishable.
Distinguished by The Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 105 (1999)
Clearly, Ruffalo is distinguishable from Vaughn, Nowacki, and the instant case in a very important respect.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring in the result.
I see no need to decide whether the notice given petitioner of the charge that formed the basis of his subsequent federal disbarment was adequate to afford him constitutional due process in the state proceedings. For I think that Theard v. United States, 354 U. S. 278 , leaves us free to hold, as I would, that such notice should not be accepted as adequate for the purposes of disbarment from a federal court. On that basis, I concur in the judgment of the Court.