holding that a federal occupational tax on wagering, which required a gambler to provide, upon threat of criminal prosecution, information that he might reasonably have supposed would be made available to prosecuting authorities, violated the gambler’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
How later courts described this case
- holding that a federal occupational tax on wagering, which required a gambler to provide, upon threat of criminal prosecution, information that he might reasonably have supposed would be made available to prosecuting authorities, violated the gambler’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
- holding that the Required Records Doctrine does not permit the government to require record keeping of “wagering activities” as part of a “wagering excise tax” when gambling was generally illegal
- holding the defendant could not be prosecuted for the failure to pay the excise tax on gambling winnings
- holding that federal wagering tax act was unconstitutional because the act did not impose explicit restrictions on use of information obtained through payment of the tax
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. $125,882 in U. S. Currency, 286 F. Supp. 643 (1968)
He asserts, however, that he is bailee as to the remainder, with a better right to it than the government.2 It is the contention of the government that since the privilege against self-incrimination can, by definition, only be interposed to prevent the incrimination of the party who asserts it, and an individual is impermissibly penalized only with respect to the forfeiture of his own property, Marchetti and Grosso a…
Distinguished by United States v. Riccio, 282 F. Supp. 979 (1968)
The government contends that Marchetti and Grosso are inapplicable here, first of all, because the Supreme Court specifically refused to rule that the wagering tax statutes as such are constitutionally impermissible; and secondly, because the holding in Marchetti and Grosso was said to be merely that the government cannot criminally punish a violation of the wagering tax laws in the face of a proper claim
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring. *
If we were writing upon a clean slate, I would agree with the conclusion reached by The Chief Justice in these cases. 1 Por I am' convinced that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was originally meant to do no more than confer a testimonial privilege upon a witness in a judicial proceeding. 2 But the Court long ago lost sight of that original mean *77 ing. In the absence of a fundamental re-examination of our decisions, the most relevant recent one being Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70 , I am compelled to join the opinions and judgments of the.Court.
[This opinion applies also to No. 2, Marchetti v. United States, ante, p. 39.]
And in Haynes v. United States, post, p. 85.
That, after all, is what the clause says:
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .