finding that the officers would have had a right to sniff the students’ lockers and automobiles and, therefore, the odors detected by their canines were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because “the dog’s olfactory sense merely ‘enhances’ that of the police officer” rather than providing a new method of detection
How later courts described this case
- finding that the officers would have had a right to sniff the students’ lockers and automobiles and, therefore, the odors detected by their canines were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because “the dog’s olfactory sense merely ‘enhances’ that of the police officer” rather than providing a new method of detection
- holding, in a constitutional context, that affirmative acts of concealment create an expectation of privacy because ”[o]ne who ... shuts the [phone booth door] behind him, and pays ... to place a call is surely entitled to assume the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world”
- holding that “the Fourth amendment protects people, not places” and that when an individual “seeks to preserve [something] as private” and this expectation of privacy is “constitutionally protected,” official intrusion into that privacy is a search that requires a warrant supported by probable cause
- explaining that "the Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ... be interposed between the citizen and the police' " (alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) )
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in United States v. Koyomejian — not on the Supreme Court's list
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1455
Questioned by United States v. Errol B. Resnick, 455 F.2d 1127 (1972)
The trial judge concluded that since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), there has been serious question of continued vitality of the open field doctrine, but he elected to follow the post-Katz cases of Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830, 89 S.Ct. 97, 21 L.Ed.2d 101 (1968), and United States v. Campbell, 395 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.), cert…
Questioned by State v. Alexander, 170 N.J. Super. 298 (1979)
The continuing validity of the curtilage doctrine was called into question after Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), which held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
Questioned by GR v. State, 638 P.2d 191 (1981)
However, the viability of the "curtilage" test has been questioned since Katz, and most courts now attempt to determine those areas in which the person challenging the search has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 104 Md. App. 1 (1995)
Every case that we have discovered interpreting a telephone conversation under the federal wiretap act has held that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy standard is inapplicable to wire communications.
Distinguished by State v. Milligan, 40 Ohio St. 3d 341 (1988)
In support of this view, appellee cites Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347. Katz, however, is inapposite since its focus was upon evidence which was allegedly the product of an illegal search and seizure.
Distinguished by People v. Catania, 427 Mich. 447 (1986)
Justice Brennan concurred in the White result because, in his view, Katz was inapplicable to behavior which occurred before the decision in Katz, p 755.
Distinguished by Lee v. State, 489 So. 2d 1382 (1986)
In Everett this Court distinguished the situation which it faced from that in Katz on the basis of the consent of one of the parties (i.e., the informant) to the compromised conversation:
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,
concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I feel compelled to reply to the separate concurring opinion of my Brother White, which I view as a wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive Branch itself labels “national security” matters.
Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they believe national security may be involved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested. Rather it should vigorously inves *360 tigate and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate the pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national security cases. They may even be the intended victims of subversive action. Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the position of adversary- and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate.
There is, so far as I understand constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth Amendment between types of crimes. Article III, § 3, gives “treason” a very narrow definition and puts restrictions on its proof. But the Fourth Amendment draws no lines between various substantive offenses. The arrests in cases of “hot pursuit” and the arrests on visible or other evidence of probable cause cut across the board and are not peculiar to any kind of crime.
I would respect the present lines of distinction and not improvise because a particular crime seems particularly heinous. When the Framers took that step, as they did with treason, the worst crime of all, they made their purpose manifest.