holding that prior convictions obtained where the defendant was not represented by counsel and where there was no indication in the record that the defendant had waived counsel could not be used as the basis for a sentence enhancement
How later courts described this case
- holding that prior convictions obtained where the defendant was not represented by counsel and where there was no indication in the record that the defendant had waived counsel could not be used as the basis for a sentence enhancement
- recognizing that a federal petition for the writ of habeas corpus permits only limited authority to review a state court’s evidentiary ruling
- holding conviction of recidivist offense invalid under due process clause when based on prior conviction for which record failed to show defendant was represented by counsel or had knowingly and intelligently waived his sixth amendment right to appointed counsel
- holding that prior convictions obtained where the 8 defendant was not represented by counsel and where there was no indication in the record that the defendant had waived counsel could not be used as the basis for a sentence enhancement
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Tubbs v. State, 2005 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 248 (2005)
Id. at 114-115, 88 S.Ct. 258. Burgett is distinguishable from Tubbs’s case in that the record in Burgett revealed that Burgett was not represented by counsel at the sentencing stage, and it was silent as to whether he had waived his right to counsel during this stage of the trial.
Distinguished by Shuman v. State, 94 Nev. 265 (1978)
Burgett is inapposite.
Distinguished by Clark v. State, 1973 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2615 (1973)
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319, relied upon by appellant, is distinguishable, because in that case it was undisputed that the accused was not represented by counsel at the time of his prior convictions.
Distinguished by Ex Parte Olvera, 1973 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2679 (1973)
The federal district court found, however, that the evidence of the prior convictions which were constitutionally defective was not used to enhance punishment and did not taint the “guilt” determination and Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), was inapplicable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice White join,
dissenting.
The record in this case shows no prosecutorial bad faith or intentional misconduct. To the extent that the prosecutor contemplated the use of prior convictions in a one-stage recidivist trial, his right to do so is of course established by Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554 , decided only last Term. The fact that the prior convictions turned out to be inadmissible for other reasons involves at the most a later corrected trial error in the admission of evidence. We do not sit as a court of errors and appeals in state cases, and I would affirm the judgment of the state court.