holding that the burden is on the person seeking a 5 Mr. Masek does allege that the federal official’s conspiracy to deter his success in litigation caused a “deprivation of [his] constitutional rights.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 10, at 7. However, Mr. Masek did not plead a Bivens claim, and even construing his pleadings liberally, he did not provide any support for his conclusory allegations of this conspiracy such that this Court could infer a violation of his constitutional rights. 13 writ to show “its right to issuance . . . is clear and indisputable”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the burden is on the person seeking a 5 Mr. Masek does allege that the federal official’s conspiracy to deter his success in litigation caused a “deprivation of [his] constitutional rights.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 10, at 7. However, Mr. Masek did not plead a Bivens claim, and even construing his pleadings liberally, he did not provide any support for his conclusory allegations of this conspiracy such that this Court could infer a violation of his constitutional rights. 13 writ to show “its right to issuance . . . is clear and indisputable”
- stating that a writ of mandamus “has traditionally been used in the federal courts only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.”
- stating that the office of mandamus "is not to `control the decision of the trial court,' but rather merely to confine the lower court to the sphere of its discretionary power" (quoting Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 383, 74 S.Ct. 145)
- explaining that “the writ [of mandamus] has been invoked . . . where it was necessary to confine a lower court to the terms of an appellate tribunal’s mandate”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Honorable Jim R. Carrigan, and Peter Kiewit Sons' Company, Harold L. Cherry, and Richard L. McVaney Parties in Interest-Respondents, 804 F.2d 599 (1986)
Although Will is distinguishable on its facts, the Court’s comments there support our reluctance to rule that this district court so clearly abused its discretion as to constitute a usurpation of its power.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s judgment to vacate and agree substantially with its opinion, but would like to add a *108 few words, which I do not understand to be in conflict with what the Court says, concerning the writ of mandamus. I agree that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which should not be issued except in extraordinary circumstances. And I also realize that sometimes the granting of mandamus may bring about the review of a case as would an appeal. Yet this does not deprive a court of its power to issue the writ. Where there are extraordinary circumstances, mandamus may be used to review an interlocutory order which is by no means “final” and thus appealable under federal statutes. Finality, then, while relevant to the right of appeal, is not determinative of the question when to issue mandamus. Rather than hinging on this abstruse and infinitely uncertain term, the issuance of’ the writ of mandamus is proper where a court finds exceptional circumstances to support such an order. In the present case it is conceivable that there are valid reasons why the Government should not be forced to turn over the requested names and that compliance with the order would inflict irreparable damage on its conduct of the case. The trouble here, as I see it, is that neither of the courts below gave proper consideration to the possible existence of exceptional facts which might justify the Government’s refusal to disclose the names. Having no doubt as to the appropriateness of mandamus, if the circumstances exist to justify it, I would vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further deliberation on whether there are special circumstances calling for the issuance of mandamus.