holding that autopsy is medical procedure and that such procedure is not critical stage of proceedings
How later courts described this case
- holding that autopsy is medical procedure and that such procedure is not critical stage of proceedings
- holding that the “proper test” to be applied when an illegal pretrial identification procedure has been conducted is to determine whether “the in-court identifications had an independent source,” i.e., “[w]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint”
- stating that the denial of a right USCA11 Case: 23-11749 Document: 72-1 Date Filed: 02/21/2025 Page: 4 of 14 4 Opinion of the Court 23-11749 to have counsel present when “analyzing . . . the accused’s finger- prints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like” does not violate the Sixth Amendment because such analyses are not critical stages of the proceedings
- holding that where defense counsel was not present at a 4 lineup identification, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the witness’s in-court 5 identification of the defendant was based on observations of the defendant other than the lineup identification
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Thornton, 1973 La. LEXIS 6581 (1973)
It is the type “single-suspect confrontation”, to use the defense counsel’s term, to which the requirements of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) are inapplicable.
Distinguished by Sims v. State, 254 Ark. 274 (1973)
gomery v. State, 251 Ark. 645, 473 S.W. 2d 885, the defendant was identified in a police lineup and later identified at the trial of the case, and in that case we found no merit in the appellant’s insistence that he was denied the assistance of counsel at the lineup where there was no proof that he asked for or was entitled to the aid of an attorney at those times and, on this point we distinguished United States v.…
Distinguished by Mourning v. Ross, 329 F. Supp. 1153 (1971)
In such circumstances the danger of insidious suggestion which concerned the Supreme Court in Wade was not present in this case and that line of cases is inapplicable here.
Distinguished by United States v. Roy Debose, Jr., 433 F.2d 916 (1970)
(It is conceded here, as the District Judge recognized, that United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), is inapplicable, since that decision does not have retroactive effect and was handed down some 20 days after the challenged lineups.)
The opinion
Mr. Justice Clark,
concurring.
With reference to the lineup point involved in this case I cannot, for the life of me, see why a lineup is not a critical stage of the prosecution. Identification of the suspect — a’prerequisite to establishment of guilt — occurs at this stage, and with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), on the books, the requirement of the presence of counsel arises, unless waived by the suspect. I dissented in Miranda but I am bound by it now, as we all are. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), precludes petitioner’s claim of self-incrimination. I therefore join the opinion of the Court.