explaining that because Mr. Butts did not have "any position in government which would permit a recovery by him to be viewed as a vindication of governmental policy," his case could not "be analogized to prosecutions for seditious libel" and "none of the particular considerations involved in New York Times [was] present"
How later courts described this case
- explaining that because Mr. Butts did not have "any position in government which would permit a recovery by him to be viewed as a vindication of governmental policy," his case could not "be analogized to prosecutions for seditious libel" and "none of the particular considerations involved in New York Times [was] present"
- holding that the New York Times privilege is available to publishers in libel actions instituted by persons “who are not public officials, but who are ‘public figures’ and involved in issues in which the public has a justified and important interest”
- holding it reckless to allege that respondent football coach "fixed" a game when defendant publication failed to investigate reports that allegation was false
- finding actual malice where “[t]he Saturday Evening Post was anxious to change its image by instituting a pol *278 icy of ‘sophisticated muckraking,’ and the pressure to produce a successful expose might have induced a stretching of standards”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) — not on the Supreme Court's list
388 U.S. 130, 147, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1987, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Embers Supper Club, Inc. v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 9 Ohio St. 3d 22 (1984)
Since plaintiff is not a public official or public figure, the holdings in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), 388 U.S. 130, requiring proof of actual malice by defendant are inapplicable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice White joins, concurring in the result in No. 150, and dissenting in No. 37.
I join 'Parts I and II of the opinion of The Chief Justice and the disposition in No. 150, Associated Press v. Walker.
In No. 37, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, insofar as The Chief Justice’s opinion demonstrates that the evidence unmistakably would support a judgment for Butts under the New York Times standard, I agree. I would, however, remand for a new trial since the charge to the jury did not comport with that standard. 1 The charge on compensatory damages directed that the jury find *173 liability on a finding of mere falsehood. And the trial court stated that punitive damages might be awarded on a finding of “actual malice” which it defined to encompass “the notion of ill will, spite, hatred and an intent to injure one,” and also to denote “a wanton or reckless indifference or culpable negligence with regard to the rights of others.” The court detailed some factors the jury could consider in applying this standard. It said, for example, that “[a] publication may be so extravagant in its denunciation and so vituperative in its character as to justify an inference of malice,” and that “proof that the plaintiff did demand a retraction but that the defendant failed to retract the article may be considered by you on the question of punitive damages.” But “[djebate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 73 . The “good motives” of the publisher can be no more relevant in the context of “public men” than in the context of criticism of “public officials.” See Garrison, supra. The court added that the Post could show in mitigation of punitive damages that “it in good faith relied upon certain matters which had come to its attention.” This makes crystal clear that the standard announced authorized the jury to award punitive damages even though it found that the Post had in good faith relied on matters which had come to its attention. The charge undoubtedly fails to comport with New York Times. 2
*174 That the evidence might support a verdict under New York Times cannot justify our taking from the jury the function of determining, under proper instructions, whether the New York Times standard has been met. The extent of this Court’s role in reviewing the facts, in a case such as this, is to ascertain whether there is evidence by which a jury could reasonably find liability under the constitutionally required instructions. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 284-292 ; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 391-394 . When, as in this case, such evidence appears, the proper disposition in this federal case is to reverse and remand with direction for a new trial. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra.
For the reasons expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan I agree that petitioner did not waive his contentions under New York Times.
The statement by the trial court that “[m]alice also denotes a wanton or reckless indifference or culpable negligence with regard to the rights of others” could reasonably have been regarded by the jury to relate not to the truth or falsity of the matter, but to the *174 Post’s attitude toward Butts’ reputation, akin to the spite and ill will in which terms the court had just defined “malice.” See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 396, n. 12 ,