holding that court-appointed appellate counsel is not required to prosecute an appeal from a criminal conviction after conscientiously determining that there is no merit to the appeal— i.e., that the appeal is “wholly frivolous”— and holding that in such situations, counsel’s request for permission to withdraw must be “accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal”
How later courts described this case
- holding that court-appointed appellate counsel is not required to prosecute an appeal from a criminal conviction after conscientiously determining that there is no merit to the appeal— i.e., that the appeal is “wholly frivolous”— and holding that in such situations, counsel’s request for permission to withdraw must be “accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal”
- holding that a criminal appellant may not be denied representation on appeal based on appointed counsel’s bare assertion that he or she is of the opinion that there is no merit to the appeal and thus providing a prophylactic procedure under such circumstances, requiring a “conscientious examination" of the case and a "brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal”
- holding that summary proceedings concluding that defendant had been accorded fair and impartial trial “cannot be an adequate substitute for the right to full appellate review available to all *370 defendants” and stating, “The constitutional1 requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client....”
- holding that if appointed counsel "is convinced, after conscientious investigation, that the appeal is frivolous, he may ask to withdraw on that account, and if the court is satisfied that counsel has diligently investigated the possible ground of appeal, and agrees with counsel's evaluation of the case, then it may allow leave to withdraw and deny leave to appeal."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported disapproved — as noted by a later court — not on the Supreme Court's list
) The Supreme Court ended footnote 13 in the Sade C. opinion with the following, “To the extent that any decision of ours or of the Courts of Appeal states or implies that the applicability of Anders goes beyond what is described in the text, it is disapproved.
in partunconfirmed confidenceDeclined to follow by N.S.H. v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services, 28 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 284 (2003)
Accordingly, we decline to extend the Anders procedure to termination of parental rights proceedings.
Declined to follow by State v. Olsen, 44 Wash. App. 671 (1986)
We decline to extend the Anders and Theobald holdings beyond the parameters set forth therein.
Declined to follow by In Re Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th 952 (1996)
For our part, we decline to apply Anders's "prophylactic" procedures in an indigent parent's appeal from a state-obtained decision adversely affecting child custody or parental status.
Declined to follow by Nsh v. Florida Dcfs, 843 So. 2d 898 (2003)
Accordingly, we decline to extend the Anders procedure to termination of parental rights proceedings.
Limited by Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000)
[4] See generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) limited by Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Octavio Bonilla Ortiz v. State (2011)
While Anders is inapplicable here, we have
Distinguished by In Re Kevin S., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (2003)
]" (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court concluded Anders was inapplicable in dependency cases because: an indigent
Distinguished by People v. Kevin S., 113 Cal. App. 4th 97 (2003)
]” (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court concluded Anders was inapplicable in dependency cases because: an indigent
Distinguished by In re D.A.S., 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1148 (1998)
The court of appeals held that Anders is inapplicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings and denied counsel’s request to withdraw. 951 S.W.2d 528.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan join,
dissenting.
The system used by California for handling indigent appeals was described by the California Supreme Court in In re Nash, 61 Cal. 2d 491, 495 , 393 P. 2d 405 , 408:
“We believe that the requirement of the Douglas case [ 372 U. S. 353 ] is met . . . when, as in this case, oounsel is appointed to represent the defendant on appeal, thoroughly studies the record, consults with the defendant and trial counsel, and conscientiously concludes that there are no meritorious *746 grounds of appeal. If thereafter the appellate court is satisfied from its own review of the record in the .light of any points raised by the defendant personally that counsel’s assessment of the record is correct, it need not appoint another counsel to represent thé defendant on appeal and may properly decide the appeal without oral argument.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court today holds this procedure unconstitutional, and imposes upon appointed counsel who wishes to withdraw from a case he deems “wholly frivolous” the requirement of filing “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” But if the record did present any such'“arguable” issues, the appeal would not be frivolous and counsel would not have filed a “no-merit” letter in the first place. *
The quixotic requirement imposed by the Court can be explained, I think, only upon the cynical assumption that an appointed lawyer’s professional representation to an appellate court in a “no-m'erit” letter is not to be trusted. That is an assumption to which I cannot subscribe. I *747 cannot believe that lawyers appointed to represent indigents are so likely to be lacking in diligence, competence, or professional honesty. Certainly there was no suggestion in the present case that the petitioner’s counsel was either incompetent or unethical.
But even if I could join in this degrading appraisal of the in forma pauperis bar, it escapes me how the procedure that the Court commands is constitutionally superior to the system now followed in California. The fundamental error in the Court’s opinion, it seems forme, is its implicit assertion that there can be but a single inflexible answer to the difficult problem of how to accord equal protection to indigent appellants in each of the 50 States.
Believing that' the procedure under which Anders’, appeal was considered was free of constitutional error, I would affirm the judgment.
The Court concedes as much when it states such a brief should be filed only when counsel believes the case to be “wholly frivolous” and then goes on to hold “if [the California appellate court] finds any of the legal points arguable-on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must . . . afford the indigent the assistance of counsel .. . .” Ante, p. 744. (Emphasis added.)
Even accepting the Court’s requirement, one would have to perceive an “arguable” issue in Anders’ case in order to remand it for a new appeal. The most that all of the courts and lawyers who have examined his case have.turned up is a claim that the prosecutor commented on his silence at trial. But Anders’ conviction was affirmed by the California District Court of Appeal six years before Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 , was decided. Our later decision in Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 , was based on the premise that prior to Griffin the practice of commenting on the defendant’s silence was well established and thus did not raise an “arguable” issue. Cf. O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U. S. 92 .