explaining that undercover agents, “in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to *630 do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant” but that when entry is gained by invitation “an agent is [not] authorized to conduct a general search for incriminating materials” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that undercover agents, “in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to *630 do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant” but that when entry is gained by invitation “an agent is [not] authorized to conduct a general search for incriminating materials” (emphasis added)
- explaining that undercover agents, “in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant” but that when entry is gained by invitation “an agent is [not] authorized to conduct a general search for incriminating materials” (emphasis added)
- finding that if a home “is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for the purposes of transacting unlawful business,” a government agent “may enter the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant.”
- concluding that consensual entry into defendant’s home did not violate any legitimate expectation of privacy even though persons entering home were in reality government agents hoping to incriminate defendant
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Ondray McKnight, 665 F.3d 786 (2011)
385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966), was inapposite and that the defense had not called the Government’s investigative techniques into question.
Distinguished by United States v. Edward Allen Schuster, 684 F.2d 744 (1982)
The defendant argues that Lewis is factually distinguishable because the defendant “invited” the agent into his home and the evidence obtained consisted only of the marijuana purchased by the agent.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Fortas joins,
concurring.
While I concur in the Court’s judgment, I vote to affirm solely on the reasoning on which the Court ulti *213 mately relies, namely that petitioner’s apartment was not an area protected by the Fourth Amendment as related to the transactions in the present case.
The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 . However, the occupant can break the seal of sanctity and waive his right to privacy in the premises. Plainly he does this to the extent that he opens his home to the transaction of business and invites anyone willing to enter to come in to trade with him. When his customer turns out to be a government agent, the seller cannot, then, complain that his privacy has been invaded so long as the agent does no more than buy his wares. Thus the corner grocery with the living quarters in the rear would not be protected with respect to the area set aside for the purchase of groceries, although the living quarters to which shoppers are not privy retain the constitutional immunity. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 .
The petitioner in this case opened his apartment for the conduct of a business, the sale of narcotics; the agent, in the same manner as any private person, entered the premises for the very purpose contemplated by the occupant and took nothing away except what would be taken away by any willing purchaser. There was therefore no intrusion upon the “sanctity” of petitioner’s home or the “privacies of life.”