Pate v. Robinson

Mr. Justice Harlan,

whom Mr. Justice Black joins, dissenting.

The facts now canvassed by this Court to support its constitutional holding were fully sifted by the Illinois Supreme Court. I cannot agree that the state court’s unanimous appraisal was erroneous and still less that it was error of constitutional proportions.

*388 The Court appears to hold that a defendant’s present incompetence may become sufficiently manifest during a trial that it denies him due process for the trial court to fail to conduct a hearing on that question on its own initiative. I do not dissent from this very general proposition, and I agree also that such an error is not “waived” by failure to raise it and that it may entitle the defendant to a new trial without further proof. Waiver is not an apposite concept where we premise a defendant so deranged that he cannot oversee his lawyers. Since our further premise is that the trial judge should and could have avoided the error, a new trial seems not too drastic an exaction in view of the proof problems arising after a significant lapse of time. 1 However, I do not believe the facts known to the trial judge in this case suggested Robinson’s incompetence at time of trial with anything like the force necessary to make out a violation of due process in the failure to pursue the question.

Before turning to the facts, it is pertinent to consider the quality of the incompetence they are supposed to indicate. In federal courts — and I assume no more is asked of state courts — the test of incompetence that warrants postponing the trial is reasonably well settled. In language this Court adopted on the one occasion it faced the issue, “the 'test must be whether . . . [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402 . In short, emphasis is on capacity to consult with counsel and to comprehend the proceed *389 ings, and lower courts have recognized that this is by no means the same test as those which determine criminal responsibility at the time of the crime. 2 The question, then, is not whether the facts before the trial judge suggested that Robinson’s crime was an insane act but whether they suggested he was incompetent to stand trial.

The Court’s affirmative answer seemingly rests on two kinds of evidence, principally adduced by Robinson to prove an insanity defense after the State rested its main case. First, there was evidence of a number of episodes of severe irrationality in Robinson’s past. Among them were the slaying of his infant son, his attempted suicide, his efforts to burn his wife’s clothing, his fits of temper and of abstraction, and his seven-week incarceration in a state hospital eight years before the trial. This evidence may be tempered by the State’s counterarguments, for example, that Robinson was found guilty of his son’s killing and that alcoholism may explain his hospitalization, but it cannot be written off entirely. The difficulty remains that while this testimony may suggest that Flossie May Ward’s killing was just one more irrational act, I cannot say as a matter of common knowledge that it evidences incapacity during the trial. Indeed, the pattern revealed may best indicate that Robinson did function adequately during most of his life interrupted by periods of severe derangement that would have been quite apparent had they occurred at trial. The second class of data pertinent to the Court’s theory, remarks by witnesses and counsel that Robinson was “presently insane,” deserves little comment. I think it apparent that these statements were addressed to Robinson’s re *390 sponsibility for the killing, that is, his ability to do insane acts, and not to his general competency to stand trial. 3

Whatever mild doubts this evidence may stir are surely allayed by positive indications of Robinson's competence at the trial. Foremost is his own behavior in the courtroom. The record reveals colloquies between Robinson and the trial judge which undoubtedly permitted a reasonable inference that Robinson was quite cognizant of the proceedings and able to assist counsel in his defense. 4 • Turning from lay impressions to those of an expert, it was stipulated at trial that a Dr. Haines, Director of the Behavior Clinic of the Criminal Court of Cook County, had examined Robinson several months earlier and, if called, would testify that Robinson “knows *391 the nature of the charge and is able to cooperate with his counsel.” The conclusive factor is that Robinson’s own lawyers, the two men who apparently had the closest contact with the defendant during the proceedings, never suggested he was incompetent to stand trial and never moved to have him examined on incompetency grounds during trial; 5 indeed, counsel’s remarks to the jury seem best read as an affirmation of Robinson’s present “lucidity” which would be highly peculiar if Robinson had been unable to assist properly in his defense. See p. 386, n. 8, ante, of the Court’s opinion.

Thus, I cannot agree with the Court that the requirements of due process were violated by the failure of the trial judge, who had opportunities for personal observation of the defendant that we do not possess, to halt the trial and hold a competency hearing on his own motion.

Several other grounds have been urged as a basis for habeas corpus relief for Robinson. These other grounds are understandably not discussed in the Court’s opinion, and I think it is sufficient for me to say I do not believe that they warrant further proceedings. In my view, the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the District Court’s dismissal of the petition reinstated.

The constitutional violation alleged is the failure to make an inquiry. In the more usual case, the simple claim that a defendant was convicted while incompetent during the trial, there is of course no proof of a constitutional violation until that incompetence is established in appropriate proceedings.

See James v. Boles, 339 F. 2d 431 ; United States v. Kendrick, 331 F. 2d 110 ; Lyles v. United States, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 254 F. 2d 725 .

At the time Robinson's mother and Mrs. Calhoun made the statements noted in the Court’s opinion, p. 383, n. 5, ante, they also stated Robinson did not know the difference between right and wrong. Counsel’s statement, too, quoted by the Court at p. 386, n. 8, ante, was directed to acquittal, not postponement. See, n. 5, infra. Mrs. Moore, a family friend, responded to the question on Robinson’s sanity by saying: “When he is in those moods, I think he is insane; when he is in those moods, because he is terrible.”

The Illinois Supreme Court stated in its opinion: “[T]he record reflects several instances where defendant displayed his ability to assist in the conduct of his defense in a reasonable and rational manner. Typical instances of when defendant displayed mental alertness, as well as understanding and knowledge of the proceeding, appear in his remarks to the court as follows: ‘Your honor, they were on the State’s witness list and the State said they have several witnesses. They produced two. For what reason, I don’t know, but I am on trial here and 1 would like to be given every consideration, and I would like that the court be adjourned until tomorrow morning — to give me time to confer with counsel for the calling of witnesses.’ Again, when discussing witnesses with the court, defendant said: ‘Well, the police are contending that the clothes they have found in Moore’s apartment was mine. That is the reason at the beginning of trial, I asked the attorney to have a pre-trial preliminary to determine the admissibility and validity of the evidence that the State was intending to use against me.’ ” 22 Ill. 2d, at 168, 174 N. E. 2d, at 823.

The record in my view does not bear out any suggestion that Robinson’s counsel apprised the trial judge that he believed Robinson incompetent to stand trial, even granting that “insane” was a synonym for “incompetent” under then-existing state law (pp. 384-385, n. 6, ante). Under Illinois law, as one would naturally expect, incompetence at the time of trial has been a ground not for acquitting the defendant but for postponing his trial; and nowhere in the record does Robinson’s counsel even hint to the judge that he believes the trial should be deferred or abated because his client is not fit to continue. The ready explanation for counsel’s references to “present insanity,” apart from emphasizing Robinson’s general lack of criminal responsibility, is that Illinois law provided that one acquitted on grounds of insanity at the time of the crime shall by the same verdict be found cured of or still afflicted with “such insanity” and committed in the latter instance. Ill. Rev. Stat., e. 38, § 592 (1959).