explaining that his previously stated "view" that "First Amendment freedoms . . . have suffered from a failure of the courts to stick to the simple language of the First Amendment" results—in Griswold—in an unwarranted expansion of freedom of speech, and stating, "My disagreement with the Court's opinion holding that there is such a violation here is a narrow one, relating to the application of the First Amendment to the facts and circumstances of this particular case"
How later courts described this case
- explaining that his previously stated "view" that "First Amendment freedoms . . . have suffered from a failure of the courts to stick to the simple language of the First Amendment" results—in Griswold—in an unwarranted expansion of freedom of speech, and stating, "My disagreement with the Court's opinion holding that there is such a violation here is a narrow one, relating to the application of the First Amendment to the facts and circumstances of this particular case"
- holding that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance,” and that “[vjarious [constitutional] guarantees create zones of privacy,” such as the Fourth Amendment’s *99 “protection against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- concluding that plaintiff doctors’ convictions on state criminal charges of disseminating birth control advice constituted injury to them sufficient to support standing for them to challenge the state statutes they had violated, even though they were asserting the constitutional rights of privacy of the persons to whom they had given the advice
- holding that the Executive Director of the Planned Parent-hood League of Connecticut and a licensed physician who had prescribed contraceptives for married persons and been convicted as accessories to the crime of using contraceptives had standing to raise the constitutional rights of their patients
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by a later decision, 597 F.2d 1104 (1979)
) On the facts of plaintiff's case we decline to extend the limited privacy doctrine described in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 471, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) to cover this situation, and therefore affirm the district court's order of dismissal of the plaintiff's sixth cause of action.
Declined to follow by Eichman v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104 (1979)
) On the facts of plaintiff’s case we decline to extend the limited privacy doctrine described in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 471, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) to cover this situation, and therefore affirm the district court’s order of dismissal of the plaintiff’s sixth cause of action.
Limited on other grounds by City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), limited on other grounds, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1682, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), limited on other grounds, City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Byars v. City of Waterbury, 47 Conn. Super. Ct. 342 (2001)
381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965), is inapposite.
Distinguished by Byars v. City of Waterbury, No. X01-Cv-99-0152489s (Nov. 19, 2001), 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 15636 (2001)
Her reliance on cases involving regulation of bodily integrity, such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705,35 L.Ed.2d 147, rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); and Griswold v.Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), is inapposite.
Distinguished by Nelson v. Jacobsen, 1983 Utah LEXIS 1150 (1983)
Griswold and Eisenstadt are inapposite because sexual relations are not a necessary element of alienation of affections.
Distinguished by Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1 (1971)
Any supposed analogy of the present case to the Griswold case is inapposite and does nothing to advance the plaintiff’s argument.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring in the judgment.
I fully agree with the judgment of reversal, bqt find myself unable to join the Court’s opinion. The reason is that it seems to me to evince an approach to this case very much like that taken by my Brothers Black and Stewart in dissent, namely: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not touch this Connecticut statute unless the enactment is found to violate some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
*500 In other words, what I find implicit in the Court’s opinion is that the “incorporation” doctrine may be used to restrict the reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. For me this is j ust~as..unacceptable constitutional doctrine as is the use of the “incorporation”^approach to impose upon the States all the requirements of the Bill of Rights as found in the provisions of the first eight amendments and in the decisions of this Court interpreting them. See, e. g., my concurring opinions in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 408 , and Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 615 , and my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522 , at pp. 539-545.
In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 . For reasons stated at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, supra, I believe that it does. While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.
A further observation seems in order respecting the justification of my Brothers Black and Stewart for their “incorporation” approach to this case. Their approach does not rest on historical reasons, which are of course wholly lacking (see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949)), but on the thesis that by limiting the content of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the protection of rights which can be found elsewhere in the Constitution, in this instance in the Bill of Rights, judges will thus be confined to “interpretation” of specific constitutional *501 provisions, and will thereby be restrained from introducing their own notions of constitutional right and wrong into the “vague contours of the Due Process Clause.” Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 170 .
While I could not more heartily agree that judicial “self restraint” is an indispensable ingredient of sound constitutional adjudication, I do submit that the formula suggested for achieving it is more hollow than real. “Specific” provisions of the Constitution, no less than “due process,” lend themselves as readily to “personal” interpretations by judges whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution in supposed “tune with the times” (post, p. 522). Need one go further than to recall last Term’s reapportionment cases, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 , and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 , where a majority of the Court “interpreted” “by the People” (Art. I, § 2) and “equal protection” (Arndt. 14) to command “one person, one vote”’ an interpretation that was made in the face of irrefutable and still unanswered history to the contrary? See my dissenting opinions in those cases, 376 U. S., at 20 ; 377 U. S., at 589 .
Judicial self-restraint will not, I suggest, be brought about in the “due process” area by the historically unfounded incorporation formula long advanced by my Brother Black, and now in part espoused by my Brother Stewart. It will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms. See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 59 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring). Adherence to these principles will not, of course, obviate all constitutional differences of opinion among judges, nor should it. Their continued recogni *502 tion will, however, go farther toward keeping most judges from roaming at large in the constitutional field than will the interpolation into the Constitution of an artificial and largely illusory restriction on the content of the Due Process Clause. *
Indeed, my Brother Black, in arguing his thesis, is forced to lay aside a host of cases in which the Court has recognized fundamental rights in the Fourteenth Amendment without specific reliance upon the Bill of Rights. Post, p. 512, n. 4.