holding a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were improperly denied by allowing the prosecutor to read, “under the guise of cross-examination to refresh [the witness’s] recollection” a statement from a witness who persisted in relying on self-incrimination grounds to avoid answering questions even after the trial court advised the witness that such a privilege was not available
How later courts described this case
- holding a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were improperly denied by allowing the prosecutor to read, “under the guise of cross-examination to refresh [the witness’s] recollection” a statement from a witness who persisted in relying on self-incrimination grounds to avoid answering questions even after the trial court advised the witness that such a privilege was not available
- holding that “[a]lthough the Solicitor’s reading of [the witness’s] alleged statement, and [the witness’s] refusals to answer, were not technically testimony, the Solicitor’s reading may well have been the equivalent in the jury’s mind of testimony that [the witness] in fact made the statement,” and therefore was the basis for a Confrontation Clause violation
- holding that it was a violation of a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause when the co-defendant was called to the stand and refused to respond and the prosecutor then treated the co-defendant as a hostile witness and read his confession, which implicated the defendant, into the record
- holding that when a prosecution witness invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege, he “could not be cross-examined on a statement imputed to but not admitted by him,” and thus defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the prosecution’s exposure of the statement to the jury
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Jacoby Lee Felix v. Deneice A. Mayle, Warden, 379 F.3d 612 (2004)
Douglas is distinguishable, however, because there was no way to cross-examine the witness who had invoked the Fifth Amendment on the subject.
Distinguished by People v. Smithey, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243 (1999)
Douglas is distinguishable from the present case.
Distinguished by State v. Smith, 687 So. 2d 529 (1996)
A reading of the case, however reveals that the facts of Douglas are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case at bar.
Distinguished by McBride v. State, 1984 Del. LEXIS 309 (1984)
380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), upon which defendant relies, are distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring in the result.
For reasons stated in the opinion of the Court, I agree that petitioner was denied a right of “confrontation” embodied in the concept of ordered liberty. I concur in the judgment of reversal on the premises stated in my opinion concurring in the result in Pointer v. Texas, ante, p. 408, decided today.