holding that the admission into evidence at the petitioner’s trial of a witness’ preliminary examination testimony inculpating the petitioner violated his right of confrontation where that witness did not testify at trial and where the petitioner did not have a “complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine” that witness through counsel at the preliminary examination
How later courts described this case
- holding that the admission into evidence at the petitioner’s trial of a witness’ preliminary examination testimony inculpating the petitioner violated his right of confrontation where that witness did not testify at trial and where the petitioner did not have a “complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine” that witness through counsel at the preliminary examination
- finding Confrontation Clause violation by admission of preliminary hearing testimony, but noting that “[t]he case before us would be quite a different one had Phillips’ statement been taken at a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine”
- holding “that the Sixth Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment” and includes “... the right of cross-examination.”
- reasoning that “[t]he fact that this right appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill Of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers ... that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Prater v. State, 148 Ga. App. 831 (1979)
The appellant bases his confrontation argument on Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 407 (85 SC 1065, 13 LE2d 923) (1965), which is factually distinguishable from the present case as evidenced by the court’s observation that "[t]he case before us would be quite a different one had [the former testimony] been taken at a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented by counsel who had been given a complet…
Distinguished by State v. Larkins, 1974 Mo. App. LEXIS 1658 (1974)
While we accept the ruling of Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witness against him, we reject its application in this case; because in our case neither Robinson nor Morris testified, therefore, no such right of confrontation ever arose.
Distinguished by United States ex rel. Walker v. Follette, 274 F. Supp. 180 (1967)
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Douglas v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965) and Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) are also inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring in the result.
I join in the judgment reversing this conviction, for the reason that the petitioner was denied the opportunity to cross-examine, through counsel, the chief witness for the prosecution. But I do not join in the Court’s pronouncement which makes “the Sixth Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him . . . oblig *410 atory on the States.” That questionable tour de force seems to me entirely unnecessary to the decision of this case, which I think is directly controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
The right of defense counsel in a criminal case to cross-examine the prosecutor’s living witnesses is “[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty,” 1 and “one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial.” 2 It is, I think, as indispensable an ingredient as the “right to be tried in a courtroom presided over by a judge.” 3 Indeed, this Court has said so this very Term. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466, 472-473 . 4
Here that right was completely denied. Therefore, as the Court correctly points out, we need not consider the case which could be presented if Phillips’ statement had been taken at a hearing at which the petitioner’s counsel was given a full opportunity to cross-examine. See West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258 .
Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 55 .
Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687, 692 .
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 727 .
See also In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133 , where the Court said that "due process requires as a minimum that an accused be given a public trial after reasonable notice of the charges, have a right to examine witnesses against him, call witnesses on his own behalf, and be represented by counsel.” 349 U. S., at 134 .