explaining the procedural safeguards that must be in place, including the burden of proof falling on the government to justify the prior restraint, the existence of a specified brief time period for the restraint prior to a judicial determination, and an avenue for prompt judicial review of the censor’s decision
How later courts described this case
- explaining the procedural safeguards that must be in place, including the burden of proof falling on the government to justify the prior restraint, the existence of a specified brief time period for the restraint prior to a judicial determination, and an avenue for prompt judicial review of the censor’s decision
- holding that an application for a license to exhibit a film must be granted or denied within a specified brief time period
- holding that “a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a sensor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system”.
- holding that “a noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system”.
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Incorporated, T/a Warwick Books v. Prince George's County, Maryland, 58 F.3d 988 (1995)
Importantly, in concluding that prior restraint analysis must be applied, the FW/PBS Court necessarily rejected the position advanced by Justice White, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that because the Dallas licensing scheme constituted a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction directed at the secondary effects of adult bookstores, the Freedman procedural safeguards were inapplicable.
Distinguished by Meltzer v. Board of Public Instruction, 577 F.2d 311 (1978)
We feel that Freedman is inapposite to the facts in the case before us.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
whom Mr. Justice Black joins,
concurring.
On several occasions I have indicated my view that movies are entitled to the same degree and kind of protection under the First Amendment as other forms of expression. Superior Films v. Department of Education, 346 U. S. 587, 588 ; Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 697 ; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 78 . * For the reasons there stated, I do not *62 believe any form of censorship — no matter how speedy or prolonged it may be — is permissible. As I see it, a pictorial presentation occupies as preferred a position as any other form of expression. If censors are banned from the publishing business, from the pulpit, from the public platform — as they are — they should be banned from the the-atre. I would not admit the censor even for the limited role accorded him in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436 . I adhere to my dissent in that case. Id., at 446-447 . Any authority to obtain a temporary injunction gives the State “the paralyzing power of a censor.” Id., at 446 . The regime of Kingsley Books “substitutes punishment by contempt for punishment by jury trial.” Id., at 447 . I would put an end to all forms and types of censorship and give full literal meaning to the command of the First Amendment.
The Court today holds that a system of movie censorship must contain at least three procedural safeguards if it is not to run afoul *62 of the First Amendment: (1) the censor must have the burden of instituting judicial proceedings; (2) any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only briefly in order to preserve the status quo; and (3) a prompt judicial determination of obscenity must be assured. Thus the Chicago censorship system, upheld by the narrowest of margins in Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43 , could not survive under today’s standards, for it provided not one of these safeguards, as the dissenters there expressly pointed out. Id., at 73-75 .