concluding that affidavit stating that “[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe” that narcotics were “being kept at the above described premises” was insufficient because “the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant” was credible
How later courts described this case
- concluding that affidavit stating that “[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe” that narcotics were “being kept at the above described premises” was insufficient because “the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant” was credible
- holding that, in most cases, statements against penal interest áre inherently reliable
- holding that, in most cases, statements against penal interest are inherently reliable
- stating that a warrant affidavit must provide the magistrate with at least “some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . . . was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 176, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 8, 198368 citing opinionsother groundsofficial confidenceRead itAbrogated by United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), abrogated by Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405).
Declined to follow by State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683 (1983)
We thus abandon the test of Aguilar and Spinelli and adopt the “totality of the circumstances” analysis as the standard by which the magistrates of Idaho will determine the existence of probable cause.
Disagreed with by Commonwealth v. Blye, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 817 (1977)
ever, we disagree with the judge’s conclusion that the affiant’s failure to state the source of his information about the television sets foreclosed reliance thereon under the two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969).
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Bailey, 295 A.D.2d 758 (2002)
378 US 108) is inapplicable (see, People v Hicks, 38 NY2d 90, 93-94; People v Bourdon, 258 AD2d 810, 811, lv denied 93 NY2d 897).
Distinguished by People v. Contompasis, 108 A.D.2d 1077 (1985)
However, the Aguilar standard is inapplicable to the instant case.
Distinguished by People v. Sullivan, 56 N.Y.2d 378 (1982)
Under such circumstances, the Aguilar standard is inapplicable since the issuing magistrate was justified in concluding, solely on the basis of the documents presented, that there was probable cause to conduct a search.
Distinguished by State v. Walker, 1982 Del. Super. LEXIS 738 (1982)
Therefore, the Aguilar two-prong test is inapplicable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
But for Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 , I would have voted to affirm the judgment of the Texas court. Given Ker , I cannot escape the conclusion that to do so would tend to “relax Fourth Amendment standards ... in derogation of law enforcement standards in the federal system . . .” (my concurring opinion in Ker, supra, at 45-46 , emphasis added). Contrary to what is suggested in the dissenting opinion of my Brother Clark in the present case (post, p. 118, note 1), the standards laid down in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480 , did in my view reflect constitutional requirements. Being unwilling to relax those standards for federal prosecutions, I concur in the opinion of the Court.