finding that an employee’s action against an employer and a union arose under the LMRA, even though the action was brought in state court because the complaint alleged the breach of a labor contract
How later courts described this case
- finding that an employee’s action against an employer and a union arose under the LMRA, even though the action was brought in state court because the complaint alleged the breach of a labor contract
- holding that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation in negotiating a deal which favored some members of the same bargaining unit over others
- holding that labor unions can choose between competing interests of members as long as they act in good faith
- finding no breach where a union president "supported one group and opposed the other" even though he represented both
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court’s opinion and judgment insofar as it relates to the claim that the Joint Conference Committee exceeded its authority under the collective bargaining agreement. Although it is undoubtedly true as a general proposition that bargaining representatives have power to alter the terms of a contract with an employer, the challenge here is not to a purported exercise of such power but to the validity of a grievance settlement reached under proceedings allegedly not authorized by the terms of the collective agreement. Moreover, a committee with authority to settle grievances whose composition is different from that in the multiunion-multiemployer bargaining unit cannot be deemed to possess power to effect changes in the bargaining agreement. When it is alleged that the union itself has engaged or acquiesced in such a departure from the collective bargaining agreement, I can see no reason why an individually affected employee may not step into the shoes of the union and maintain a § 301 suit himself.
*360 But insofar as petitioners’ claim rests upon alleged unfair union representation in the grievance proceeding, I agree with the views expressed in the concurring opinion of my Brother Goldberg {ante, 355-358) (except that I would expressly reserve the question of whether a suit of this nature would be maintainable under § 301 where it is alleged or proved that the employer was a party to the asserted unfair union representation). However, the conclusion that unilateral unfair union representation gives rise only to a cause of action for violation of a duty implicit in the National Labor delations Act brings one face-to-face with a further question: Does such a federal cause of action come within the play of the preemption doctrine, San Diego Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 , contrary to what would be the case were such a suit to lie under § 301, Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 ? Short of deciding that question, I do not think it would be appropriate to dispose of this case simply by saying that no unfair union representation was shown in this instance. For if there be preemption in this situation, Garmon would not only preclude state court jurisdiction but would also require this Court initially to defer to the primary jurisdiction of the Labor Board.
The preemption issue is a difficult and important one, carrying ramifications extending far beyond this particular case. It should not be decided without our having the benefit of the views of those charged with the administration of the labor laws. To that end I would reverse the judgment of the state court to the extent that it rests upon a holding that the Joint Conference Committee acted beyond the scope of its authority, set the case for reargument on the unfair representation issue, and invite the National Labor Relations Board to present its views by brief and oral argument on the preemption question. Cf. Retail Clerks International Assn. v. Schermerhorn, 373 U. S. 746, 757 ; 375 U. S. 96 .