holding that 28 Case: 11-15258 Date Filed: 02/26/2013 Page: 29 of 38 a state could not force an individual to choose between “following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting [unemployment compensation] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand” without unconstitutionally burdening the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
How later courts described this case
- holding that 28 Case: 11-15258 Date Filed: 02/26/2013 Page: 29 of 38 a state could not force an individual to choose between “following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting [unemployment compensation] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand” without unconstitutionally burdening the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
- explaining that providing Sabbatarian business owners an exception to Sunday closing laws was not an adequate less restrictive alternative in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), because the exception appeared to present an administrative problem or to afford the exempted class a competitive advantage rendering the Sunday closing scheme unworkable
- holding that a state could not force an individual to choose between “following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting [unemployment compensation] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand” without unconstitutionally burdening the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion
- reasoning that forcing someone "to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand . . . . puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled by Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) — not on the Supreme Court's list
374 U.S. 398, 401-410 (1963), abrogated in part by Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-83
Questioned — as noted by a later court
We note that the continuing vitality of the Sherbert test has been limited by the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), which held that generally applicable criminal laws need not be justified by a compelling interest to withstand attack under the Free Exercise Clause.
in partmedium confidence
Distinguished
Distinguished by Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v. City of Jackson, 478 Mich. 373 (2007)
Smith, supra at 884, held that Sherbert was distinguishable because Sherbert involved an “individualized governmental assessment”; that is, the “good cause” standard at issue in Sherbert allowed the government to consider the plaintiffs “particular circumstances.
Distinguished by Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023 (2004)
The Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause analysis articulated in Sherbert was inapplicable because the law was not aimed at promoting or restricting religious beliefs.[3] Noting that it had never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except for the denial of unemployment compensation, the Supreme Court stated its reasons for refusing to apply the test in the context of the…
Distinguished by Sanderson v. People, 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3169 (2000)
interest test, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), emphasizing that the test was inapplicable to "across-the-board" eriminal prohibitions on a particular form of conduct.
Distinguished by Clark v. Review Board of the Department of Employment & Training Services, 1989 Ind. App. LEXIS 106 (1989)
"The respondents also contend that Sherbert is inapposite because, in that case, the employee was dismissed by the employer's action.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring.
The case we have for decision seems to me to be of small dimensions, though profoundly important. The question is whether the South Carolina law which dénies unemployment compensation to a Seventh-day Adventist, who, because of her religion, has declined to work on her Sabbath, is a law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion as those words are used in the First Amendment. *411 It seems obvious to me that this-law does run afoul of that clause.
Religious scruples of Moslems require them to attend a mosque on Friday and to pray five times daily. 1 Religious scruples of a Sikh require -him to carry a regular or a symbolic sword. Rex v. Singh, 39 A. I. R. 53 (Allahabad, 1952). Religious scruples of a Jehovah’s Witness teach him to be a colporteur, going from door to door, from town to town, distributing his religious pamphlets. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 . Religious scruples of a Quaker compel him to refrain from swearing and to affirm instead. See King v. Fearson, Fed. Cas. No. 7,790, 14 Fed. Cas. 520 ; 1 U. S. C. § 1 ; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43 (d); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655 (dissenting opinion). Religious scruples of a Buddhist may require him to refrain from partaking of any flesh, even of fish. 2
The examples could be multiplied, including those of the Seventh-day Adventist whose Sabbath is Saturday and who is advised not to eat some meats. 3 .
These suffice,, however, to show that .many-people hold beliefs alien to the majority of our society — beliefs that are. protected by the First Amendment but which could easily be trod upon under the guise of “police” or “health” regulations reflecting the majority’s views'
Some have thought that a majority of a community can, through state action, compel a minority to observe their particular religious scruples so long as the majority’s rule can be said to perform some valid secular function. *412 That was the essence of the Court’s decision in the Sunday Blue Law Cases (Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U. S. 617 ; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 ; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 ), a ruling from which I- then dissented (McGowan v. Maryland, supra, pp. 575-576 ) and still dissent. See Arlan’s Dept. Store v. Kentucky, 371 U. S. 218 .
That ruling of the Court travels part of the distance that South Carolina asks us to go now. She asks us to hold that when it comes to a day of rest a Sabbatarian must conform with the scruples of the 'majority in order to obtain unemployment benefits.
The result turns not on the degree of injury, which may indeed be nonexistent by ordinary standards. The harm is the interference with the individual’s scruples or conscience — an important area of privacy which the First Amendment fences off from government. The interference here is as' plain as it is in Soviet Russia, where a churchgoer is given a second-class citizenship, resulting in harm though perhaps not in measurable damages.
This case is resolvable not in terms of what an individual can demand of government, but solely in terms of what government may not .-do. to an individual in violar tion of his religious scruples. The fact that government cannot exact from me a surrender of one iota of my religious scruples does not, of course, mean, that L can demand of government a sum of money, the better to exercise them. For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the' government.
Those considerations, however, are not relevant here. If appellant is otherwise qualified for unemployment benefits, payments will be made to her not as a Seventh-day Adventist, but as an unemployed worker. Conceivably these payments will indirectly benefit her church, *413 but no more so than does the salary of any public employee. Thus, this case does not involve the problems of direct or indirect state assistance to a religious organization — matters relevant to the Establishment Clause, not in issue here.
See Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Cornell Press, 1953), 336, 493.
See Narasu, The Essence of Buddhism (3d ed. 1948), 52-55 ; 6 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (1913), 63-65.
See Seventh-day Adventists Answer Questions on Doctrine (1957), 149-153, 622-624; Mitchell, Seventh-Day Adventists (1st ed. 1958), 127, 176-178.