holding that a may be determined only by evaluating the evidence defendant’s due process rights are violated where the collectively. Id. at 436 (“The fourth and final aspect of . . . government withholds evidence favorable to a defendant that materiality to be stressed here is its definition in terms of is “material either to guilt or to punishment”). “There are suppressed evidence considered collectively, not item by three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at item.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a may be determined only by evaluating the evidence defendant’s due process rights are violated where the collectively. Id. at 436 (“The fourth and final aspect of . . . government withholds evidence favorable to a defendant that materiality to be stressed here is its definition in terms of is “material either to guilt or to punishment”). “There are suppressed evidence considered collectively, not item by three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at item.”
- holding that the right to due process has been violated whenever “[a] prosecution ... withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty,” because such a withholding “casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice”
- holding that the failure of the government to disclose to the defense material information favorable to the accused violates defendant’s due process rights and that constitutional error results when the absence of that information caused defendant to be denied a fair trial
- holding “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 (2012)
The validity of those decisions allowing a challenge to a guilty plea based on a Brady violation have been called into question following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002)—the Court’s only decision to date that has addressed Brady in the guilty-plea context.
Declined to follow by State v. Hill, 368 S.C. 649 (2006)
Because they are fundamentally different from a criminal trial and other pre-sentencing proceedings, we decline to extend the Brady rule to probation revocation proceedings.8 The relevant precedent, particularly Gagnon; Morrissey, and Franks, already requires that a probationer be afforded reasonable discovery.
Declined to follow by Asay v. Florida Parole Com'n, 649 So. 2d 859 (1994)
Accordingly, we decline to extend the rule, and we hold that Brady has no application to clemency proceedings in Florida.
Declined to follow by State v. Iacona, Unpublished Decision (3-15-2000) (2000)
We decline to extend Brady to this degree.
Disagreed with by State v. Campbell, 558 S.W.3d 554 (2018)
However, we disagree with the trial court's legal conclusion that Defendant's knowledge of the evidence the State allegedly failed to disclose is insufficient to defeat his Brady claim.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d 1078 (2018)
Conversely, cases in which the Supreme Court has found the suppression of impeachment evidence was not material under Brady are easily distinguishable.
Distinguished by United States v. Bravo, 350 F. Supp. 3d 16 (2018)
The Brady rule is inapplicable in cases where a defendant pleads guilty.
Distinguished by Foor v. Smith, 416 P.3d 858 (2018)
The superior court granted review of the amended special action complaint and denied the requested relief on the merits, noting that Brady is inapplicable in civil cases.
Distinguished by Bolden v. City of Chi., 293 F. Supp. 3d 772 (2017)
Brady claims involving a failure to disclose evidence are distinguishable from cases involving destruction of evidence.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Black joins,
dissenting.
I think this case presents only a single federal question: did the order of the Maryland Court of Appeals granting a new trial, limited to the issue of punishment, violate petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection? 1 In my opinion an affirmative answer would *93 be required if the Boblit statement would have been admissible on the issue of guilt at petitioner’s original trial. This indeed seems to be the clear implication of this Court’s opinion.
The Court, however, holds that the Fourteenth Amendment was not infringed because it considers the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and the other Maryland cases dealing with Maryland’s constitutional provision making juries in criminal cases “the Judges of Law, as well as of fact,” as establishing that the Boblit statement woüld not have been admissible at the original trial on the issue of petitioner’s guilt.
But I cannot read the Court of Appeals’ opinion with any such assurance. That opinion can as easily, and perhaps more easily, be read as indicating that the new trial ■ limitation followed from the Court of Appeals’ concept of its power, under § 645G of the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Md. Code, Art. 27 (1960 Cum. Supp.) and Rule 870 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, to fashion appropriate relief meeting the peculiar circumstances of this case, 2 rather than from the view that the Boblit statement would have been relevant at the original trial only on the issue of punishment. 226 Md., at 430, 174 A. 2d, at 171. This interpretation is indeed fortified by the Court of Appeals’ earlier general discussion as to the admissibility of third-party confessions, which falls short of saying anything that is disposi- *94 tive of the crucial issue here. 226 Md., at 427-429, 174 A. 2d, at 170. 3
Nor do I find anything in any of the other Maryland cases cited by the Court .{ante, pj 89) which bears on the admissibility vel non of the Boblit statement on the issue of guilt. . None of these cases suggests anything moré relevant here than that a jury may not “overrule” the trial court on questions relating to the admissibility of evidence. Indeed they are by. no means clear as to what happens if the jury in fact undertakes to do so. In this very case, for example, the trial court charged that “in the final analysis the jury are the judges of both the law and the facts, and the verdict in this case is entirely the jury’s responsibility.” (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, uncertainty on this score is compounded by the State’s acknowledgment at the oral argument here that the withheld .Boblit statement would have been admissible at the trial on the issue of guilt. 4
In this state of uncertainty as to the proper’ answer to the critical underlying issue of state law, and in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals did not in terms *95 address itself to the equal protection question, I do not see how we can properly resolve this case- at this juncture. I think the appropriate course is to vacate the judgment of the State Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for further consideration in light of the governing constitutional principle stated at the outset of this opinion. Cf. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551 .
I agree with my Brother White that there is no necessity for deciding in this case the broad due process questions with which the Court deals at pp. 86-88 of its opinion.
Section 645G provides in part: “If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings, and any supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other matters that may be necessary and proper.” Rule 870 provides that the Court of Appeals “will either affirm or reverse the judgment from which the appeal wras taken, or direct the. manner in which it shall be modified, changed or amended."
It is-noteworthy that the Court of Appeals did not indicate that it was limiting in any way the authority of Day v. State, 196 Md. 384 , 76 A. 2d 729 . In that case two defendants were jointly tried and convicted of felony murder. Each admitted participating in the felony but accused the other of the homicide. On appeal the defendants attacked the trial court’s denial of a severance, and the State argued that neither defendant was harmed by the statements put in evidence at the joint trial because admission of the felony amounted to admission of guilt of felony murder. Nevertheless the Court of Appeals found an abuse of discretion and ordered separate new trials on all issues..
In response to a question from the Bench as to whether Boblit’s statement, had it been offered at petitioner’s original trial, would have been admissible for all .purposes, counsel for the State, after some colloquy, stated: “It would have been, yes.” ”