stating that "[i]f, for any reason not attributable to the inexcusable neglect of petitioner, evidence crucial to the adequate consideration of the constitutional claim was not developed at the state hearing, a federal hearing is compelled” and that "[t]he standard of inexcusable default ... adequately protects the legitimate state interest in orderly criminal procedure, for it does not sanction needless piecemeal presentation of constitutional claims in the form of deliberate by-passing of state procedures”
How later courts described this case
- stating that "[i]f, for any reason not attributable to the inexcusable neglect of petitioner, evidence crucial to the adequate consideration of the constitutional claim was not developed at the state hearing, a federal hearing is compelled” and that "[t]he standard of inexcusable default ... adequately protects the legitimate state interest in orderly criminal procedure, for it does not sanction needless piecemeal presentation of constitutional claims in the form of deliberate by-passing of state procedures”
- explaining that “the coequal responsibilities of state and federal judges in the administration of federal constitutional law are such that we think the district judge may, in the ordinary case in which there has been no articulation, properly assume that the state trier of fact applied correct standards of federal law to the facts, in the absence of evidence ... that there is reason to suspect that an incorrect standard was in fact applied.”
- explaining that “if the state court has decided the merits of the claim but has made no express findings,” a court may still “reconstruct the findings of the state trier of fact, either because his view of the facts is plain from his opinion or because of other indicia”
- holding that an evidentiary hearing in federal court on habeas is appropriate if, among other things, the state court did not adequately develop the material facts or did not conduct sufficient fact-finding to “afford a full and fair hearing”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 203, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesMay 4, 1992242 citing opinionsother groundsofficial confidenceRead itSuperseded by statute, as recognized in Thomas Corry Joyner, Jr. v. John C. King, Secretary of La. Dept. Of Corrections, and Frank J. Blackburn, Warden, La. State Penitentiary
372 U.S. 293, 319, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), superseded by statute on other grounds (see Joyner v. King, 786 F.2d 1317, 1321, 1322 (5th Cir.1986) (stating that § 2254 was amended to codify the ruling in
Distinguished
Distinguished by Allen v. State, 231 Ga. 17 (1973)
The cases of Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199 (80 SC 274, 4 LE2d 242); Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433 (81 SC 1541, 6 LE2d 948); and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (83 SC 745, 9 LE2d 770) are distinguishable from the instant case on their facts.
Distinguished by McKinney v. Boles, 254 F. Supp. 433 (1966)
The Court has concluded not to do so, for Townsend is distinguishable from the present case in several aspects.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Goldberg,
concurring.
I join in the opinion and judgment of the Court and add a few words by way of comment on the dissenting opinion of my Brother Stewart.
*323 I cannot agree with Mr. Justice Stewart that the instructions given to the jury by the trial judge on the issue of credibility indicate the application of a proper constitutional test to measure the voluntariness — and hence the admissibility — of the petitioner’s disputed confession of the Boone murder. In my view, the very portions of the instructions excerpted by my Brother Stewart support, if anything, the contrary conclusion that an improper and constitutionally impermissible standard was utilized by the trial judge himself in the suppression hearing.
If, as suggested by my Brother Stewart, these instructions are taken to evidence the exclusionary standard applied by the trial judge in ruling on the petitioner’s motion to suppress, they reflect error of constitutional dimension, as does the standard of admissibility contained in the affirming opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court. While the appellate court, as pointed out in the opinion of The Chief Justice, see ante. pp. 319-321, appears to have adopted a test of “coherency” to measure the admissibility of the confession, the trial court seemingly concluded that inducement of amnesia was a prerequisite to disregard of the confession. Both standards, whether or not intended to incorporate similar elements, fail to conform to the requisite test.
The third paragraph of the instructions quoted by my Brother Stewart in footnote 2, post, p. 330, advises the jury that it might discount the confession if it found that administration of the drug caused the petitioner to “lose his memory,” to suffer “a state of amnesia” during the period of questioning, and to be unable “to control his answers or to assert his will by denying the crime charged.” By use of the conjunctive to incorporate the requirement of loss of control, this instruction indicates the trial court’s apparent view that if the drug had the effect of overbearing the petitioner’s will but did not also cause loss of *324 memory, the confession would nonetheless remain acceptable evidence of guilt. This conclusion is buttressed by the instruction quoted in the concluding paragraph of note 2 in my Brother Stewart's dissenting opinion, in which the trial court indicates that the confession might be disregarded by the jury not simply if the drug had the effect asserted by the petitioner’s expert in response to a hypothetical question, but only if, in addition, the drug so affected the petitioner’s consciousness that “he did not know what he was doing.” The petitioner may have been fully aware of what he was doing in confessing and may have suffered no loss of memory, but that is not the issue. The crucial question, and the measure of evidentiary propriety under the Constitution, is whether the drug— whatever label was or was not affixed to it — so overbore the petitioner’s will that he was unable to resist confessing. Whether or not he was conscious of what he was doing, the petitioner could, because of the drug, have been wholly unable to stop himself from admitting guilt. *
In the absence of contrary indications, I think we must recognize that the misconception of the constitutional standard evidenced by these instructions may well have infected the trial judge’s ruling at the suppression hearing. The inference of error is not negatived by the remainder of the instructions, which permit disregard of the confession if induced by force, physical or mental, duress, or promise of reward. In the context of the instructions as a whole, these references to “voluntariness” do not meet the problems raised by the administration of the drug to the petitioner and do not vitiate the crucial inference that *325 the trial judge viewed exclusion as dependent upon the presence of facts in addition to a drug-induced sterilization of the petitioner’s will.
For the reasons contained in the opinion of the Court, and on the basis of what I believe to be the wholly fair inference that the trial court misconceived the proper constitutional measure of admissibility of the petitioner’s confession, the lack of any indication that the trial court did utilize the correct test, and the state appellate court’s apparent application of a similarly erroneous standard, I agree that a hearing must be held below.
Finally, the Court’s opinion does not warrant my Brother Stewart’s criticism as to the propriety or wisdom of articulating standards to govern the grant of eviden-tiary hearings in habeas corpus proceedings. The setting of certain standards is essential to disposition of this case and a definition of their scope and application is an appropriate exercise of this Court’s adjudicatory obligations. Particularly when, as here, the Court is directing the federal judiciary as to its role in applying the historic remedy in a difficult and sensitive area involving large issues of federalism, the careful discharge of our function counsels that, “in order to preclude individualized enforcement of the Constitution in different parts of the Nation, [we] . . . lay down as specifically as the nature of the problem permits the standards or directions that should govern the District Judges in the disposition of applications for habeas corpus by prisoners under sentence of State courts.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 501-502 (separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter).
The petitioner’s initial resistance to admitting guilt, his sudden change in attitude, and the veritable flood of confessions succeeding immediately upon administration of the drug to him, see ante, pp. 306-307, all indicate the real possibility that his will was so overborne. Moreover, the reliability of a number of these confessions is seriously impaired. See ibid.