stating that a “strong presumptive validity ... attaches to an Act of Congress” and that, when possible, courts should seek an interpretation that sup *679 ports the constitutionality of legislation and avoid invalidating a statute as vague
How later courts described this case
- stating that a “strong presumptive validity ... attaches to an Act of Congress” and that, when possible, courts should seek an interpretation that sup *679 ports the constitutionality of legislation and avoid invalidating a statute as vague
- stating that a “strong presumptive validity . . . attaches to an Act of Congress” and that, when possible, courts should seek an interpretation that supports the constitutionality of legislation and avoid invalidating a statute as vague
- holding that a provision of the Robinson-Patman Act making it a crime to sell goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor was not unconstitutionally vague
- holding statute making it a crime to sell goods at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor” is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to sales made below cost without any legitimate commercial objective and with specific intent to destroy competition
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mu. Justice Black,
with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Goldberg join, dissenting.
The statute here involved makes it a crime to sell “goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.” 15 U. S. C. § 13a. In United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921), this Court held unconstitutional and void for vagueness a statute which made it a crime “for any person willfully ... to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge” in dealing in or with any necessaries. The rule established by that case has been often followed, 1 is in my judgment sound, and should control this case. Ac *38 cordingly, I would affirm the District Court’s judgment holding the statute invalid. The Court here attempts by interpretation to substitute unambiguous standards for the vague standard of “unreasonably low prices” used by Congress in the statute. It seems to me that if this criminal statute is to be so drastically reconstructed it should be done by Congress, not by us. Moreover, I agree with the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, which concluded:
“Doubts besetting Section 3’s constitutionality seem well founded; no gloss imparted by history or adjudication has settled the vague contours of this harsh criminal law.” 2
E. g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445 (1927); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939); cf. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174 (1952).
Atty. Gen. Nat. Comm. Antitrust Rep. 201 (1955) (recommending repeal of §3).