explaining that the purpose of the related improper venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a), is “avoiding the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often turn”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the purpose of the related improper venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a), is “avoiding the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often turn”
- recognizing “the injustice” that would result “in plaintiffs losing a substantial part of its cause of action under the statute of limitations merely because it made a mistake in thinking that the respondent corporations could be found or that they transact business” in the forum venue
- holding that "[t]he language of § 1406(a) is amply broad 1 enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case 2 as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or 3 4 not."
- holding that the language of § 1406 "is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, dissenting.
The notion that a District Court may deal with an in personam action in such a way as possibly to affect a defendant’s substantive rights without first acquiring jurisdiction over him is not a familiar one in federal *468 jurisprudence. No one suggests that Congress was aware that 28 U. S. C. § 1406 (a) might be so used when it enacted that statute. The “interest of justice” of which the statute speaks and which the Court's opinion emphasizes in support of its construction of § 1406 (a) is assuredly not a one-way street. And it is incongruous to consider, as the Court’s holding would seem to imply, that in the “interest of justice” Congress sought in § 1406 (a) to deal with the transfer of cases where both venue and jurisdiction are lacking in the district where the action is commenced, while neglecting to provide any comparable alleviative measures for the plaintiff who selects a district where venue is proper but where personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained. *
In these circumstances I think the matter is better left for further action by Congress, preferably after the Judicial Conference of the United States has expressed its views on the subject. Cf. Miner v. Atlass, 363 U. S. 641, 650-652 . Meanwhile, substantially for the reasons elaborated in the opinion of Judge Moore, 288 F. 2d 579 , I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In an ordinary diversity suit, for example, a plaintiff may bring suit in the judicial district where he resides. 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (a). But if he is unable to get personal service on the defendant in the territory defined by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4 (f), his suit will be dismissed. See Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U. S. 619 ; cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438, 442-443 . Since this would not be “a case laying venue in the wrong division or district/’ § 1406 (a) would be inapplicable.