holding that because the individual Street plaintiffs “have in the course of [this action] made known to their respective unions their objection to the use of their money for the support of political causes[,] . . . the respective unions were without power to use payments thereafter tendered by them for such political causes”
How later courts described this case
- holding that because the individual Street plaintiffs “have in the course of [this action] made known to their respective unions their objection to the use of their money for the support of political causes[,] . . . the respective unions were without power to use payments thereafter tendered by them for such political causes”
- contrasting union-shop agreements with “[u]n-ions composed of a voluntary membership,” and explaining that “to the extent that Government steps in to force people to help espouse the particular causes of a group, that group — whether composed of railroad workers or lawyers — loses its status as a voluntary group”
- finding class inappropriate in suit for injunctive relief against political expenditures and for restitution because all members of proposed class had not "specifically objected to the exaction of dues for political purposes."
- noting that “if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Liberty Counsel v. Florida Bar Board of Governors, 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 347 (2009)
We find that the concern expressed in Street is inapplicable with regard to The Florida Bar.
Distinguished by Florida Bar re Frankel, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 444 (1991)
We find that the concern expressed in Street is inapplicable with regard to The Florida Bar.
Distinguished by Beck v. Communications Workers of America (C.W.A.), 776 F.2d 1187 (1985)
It is defendants’ position, though, that the construction of section 2, Eleventh as first stated in Street and later reiterated in Allen and Ellis, is inapplicable in the construction of section 8(a)(3), despite their similarity in language and purpose, and despite the use of those cases, in construing a similar Michigan statute in Abood.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Whittaker,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Understanding the Court’s opinion to hold — put in my own words — that, in enacting § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, Congress intended to, and impliedly did, limit the use that railway labor unions may make of dues, fees and assessments, collected from those of its members who were or are required to become or remain its members by force of union shop contracts negotiated as permitted by that section, only to defray the costs of negotiating and administering collective bargaining agreements — including the adjustment and settlement of disputes — and that the Hanson case, rightly construed, upholds no more than that, I join Points I, II and III of the Court’s opinion.
But I dissent from Point IV of the Court’s opinion. In respect to that point, it seems appropriate to make the following observations. When many members pay the same amount of monthly dues into the treasury of the union which dispenses the fund for what are, under the Court’s opinion, both permitted and proscribed activities, how can it be told whose dues paid for what? Let us suppose a union with two members, each paying monthly dues of three dollars, and that one does but the other does not object to his dues being expended for “proscribed *780 activity” — whatever that phrase may mean. Of the dues for a given month, the union expends four dollars for admittedly proper activity and two dollars for “proscribed activity,” answering to the objector that the two dollars spent for “proscribed activity” were not from his, but from the other’s, dues. Would not the result be that the objector was thus required to pay not his one-half but three-fourths of the union’s legitimate expenses? Or, has not the objector nevertheless paid a ratable part of the cost of the “proscribed activity”?
The Court suggests that a proper decree might require “restitution” to the objector of that part of his dues that is equal to the ratio of dues spent for “proscribed activity” to total dues collected by the union. But even if the Court could draw a clear line between what is and what is not “proscribed activity,” the accounting and proof problems involved would make the remedy most onerous and impractical. But when there is added to this a full recognition of the practical impossibility of judicially drawing the clear line mentioned and also of the fact that the local unions which collect the dues promptly pay a part of them to the national union which, in turn, also engages in “proscribed activity,” it becomes plain that the suggested restitution remedy is impossible of practical performance.
It would seem to follow that the only practical remedy possible is the one formulated by the Georgia courts, and I would approve it.