holding that the confession of an illiterate, mentally impaired accused was coerced, even though there was no physical maltreatment, after police kept him isolated in their custody, systematically subjected him to questioning over several days, enlisted his spouse to pressure him into confessing, failed to act on his request for counsel, and failed to advise him of his constitutional rights
How later courts described this case
- holding that the confession of an illiterate, mentally impaired accused was coerced, even though there was no physical maltreatment, after police kept him isolated in their custody, systematically subjected him to questioning over several days, enlisted his spouse to pressure him into confessing, failed to act on his request for counsel, and failed to advise him of his constitutional rights
- holding confession involuntary where accused was held for four days before confession, questioned every day with the stated intention of obtaining a confession, not advised of his right to remain silent, denied a lawyer even though he requested one and confronted with his wife and daughter at the police station in an encounter that left him sobbing
- explaining that the volun-tariness inquiry requires “the application ... of standards for judgment - informed by the larger legal conceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of law but which, also, comprehend both induction from, and anticipation of, factual circumstances”
- noting that mental incapacity was a relevant factor in determining that holding the defendant — a “mental defective ... with an intelligence quotient of sixty-four” — in effective police custody for four nights and five days, refusing to let the defendant speak with anybody other than his co-defendant and wife, and repeatedly questioning the defendant culminating in a four-and-a-half hour questioning after which he confessed, was coercive
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22 (1989)
Culombe is inapposite; in that case, the defendant was held for five days of repeated questioning during which the police employed coercive tactics.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
concurring.
It has not been the custom of the Court, in deciding the cases which come before it, to write lengthy and abstract dissertations upon questions which are neither pre *636 sented by the record nor necessary to a proper disposition of the issues raised. The opinion which announces the judgment of the Court in the instant case has departed from this custom and is in the nature of an advisory opinion, for it attempts to resolve with finality many difficult problems which are at best only tangentially involved here. The opinion was unquestionably written with the intention of clarifying these problems and of establishing a set of principles which could be easily applied in any coerced-confession situation. However, it is doubtful that such will be the result, for while three members of the Court agree to the general principles enunciated by the opinion, they construe those principles as requiring a result in this case exactly the opposite from that reached by the author of the opinion. This being true, it cannot be assumed that the lower courts and law enforcement agencies will receive better guidance from the treatise for which this case seems to have provided a vehicle. On an abstract level, I find myself in agreement with some portions of the opinion and in disagreement with other portions. However, I would prefer not to write on many of the difficult questions which the opinion discusses until the facts of a particular case make such writing necessary. In my view, the reasons which have compelled the Court to develop the law on- a case-by-case approach, to declare legal principles only in the context of specific factual situations, and to avoid expounding more than is necessary for the decision of a given case are persuasive. See Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 461-462 , and cases cited; Poe v. Ullman, ante, p. 497. I see no reason for making an exception in this case, and I am therefore unable to join the opinion which announces the judgment of the Court. Accordingly, I join the separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan.