noting that “all income from whatever source derived” has been held to mean “all accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion” (quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431, 75 S.Ct. 473, 99 L.Ed. 483 (1955))
How later courts described this case
- noting that “all income from whatever source derived” has been held to mean “all accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion” (quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431, 75 S.Ct. 473, 99 L.Ed. 483 (1955))
- holding that embezzled funds must be included in the embezzler's gross income for Federal income tax purposes in the year in which they were misappropriated
- noting "intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted," and defining gross income broadly to include all gains from which, "when its recipient has such control over it . . ., as a practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic value"
- stating that under sec. 61, there is taxable income if (1) the income was received and (2) it was illegal to receive the income
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Clark,
concurring in part and dissenting in part as to the opinion of The Chief Justice.
Although I join in the specific overruling of Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U. S. 404 (1946), in The Chief Justice’s opinion, I would affirm this conviction on either of two grounds. I believe that the Court not only devitalized Wilcox , by limiting it to its facts in Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S. 130 (1952), but that in effect the Court overruled that case sub silentio in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426 (1955). Even if that not be true, in my view the proof shows conclusively that petitioner, in willfully failing to correctly report his income, placed no bona fide reliance on Wilcox .