finding that the district court did not deny the defendant the allocution opportunity to which Rule 32(a) entitled him where the trial judge’s question, “Did you want to say something?,” without being addressed to any particular person, “may well have been directed to the defendant and not to his counsel”
How later courts described this case
- finding that the district court did not deny the defendant the allocution opportunity to which Rule 32(a) entitled him where the trial judge’s question, “Did you want to say something?,” without being addressed to any particular person, “may well have been directed to the defendant and not to his counsel”
- holding that failure to afford a defendant the opportunity to speak to the sentencing court was a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a), and constituted a denial of due process, yet stating that such an error could be harmless
- holding that under: Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right of allocution is personal to the defendant, and is not satisfied by affording counsel an opportunity to speak on the defendant’s behalf
- finding that the district court did not deny the defendant the allocution opportunity to which Rule 32(a
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by State v. Valedon, 261 Conn. 381 (2002)
We disagree with the Appellate Court’s reliance on Green and Hill because, at the time that what is now Practice Book § 43-10 (3) was adopted in 1976, rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had been amended to add the specific requirement that the court inquire of a defendant whether he wished to make a statement before sentencing.7 The appropriate referent in 1976, therefore, was to amended rule
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gary Stewart Boardman v. Wayne Estelle, Warden, 957 F.2d 1523 (1992)
The dissent summarily dismisses Green on the premise that it is inapplicable because the Court was construing Rule 32(a).
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring.
I join in affirming the judgments. Rule 32 (a) does not seem to me clearly to require a district judge in every case to volunteer to the defendant an opportunity personally to make a statement, when the defendant has a lawyer at his side who speaks fully on his behalf. But I do think the better practice in sentencing is to assure the defendant an express opportunity to speak for himself, in addition to anything that his lawyer may have to say. I would apply such a rule prospectively, in the exercise of our supervisory capacity. See Couch v. United States, 235 F. 2d 519 .