stating that the statute uses the term "gift" in a more colloquial sense: "the mere absence of a legal or moral obligation to make * * * a payment does not establish that it is a gift"
How later courts described this case
- stating that the statute uses the term "gift" in a more colloquial sense: "the mere absence of a legal or moral obligation to make * * * a payment does not establish that it is a gift"
- holding that fact-finding tribunal must determine existence of a “gift” for tax purposes based on its “experience with the mainsprings of human conduct”
- affirming as not clearly erroneous a finding of fact that a transfer was not a gift where that conclusion was “based in the sort of informed experience with human affairs that fact-finding tribunals should bring to this task.”
- reversing Court of Appeals and affirming the Tax Court, finding that a purported gift was a recompense for past services or an inducement for the taxpayer to be of further service in the future
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the Court that it ivas not clearly erroneous for the Tax Court to find as it did in No. 376 that the automobile transfer to Duberstein was not a gift, and so *294 I agree with the Court’s opinion and judgment reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals in that case.
I dissent in No. 546, Stanton v. United States. The .District Court found that the $20,000 transferred to Mr. Stanton by his former employer at the end of ten years’ service was a gift and therefore exempt from taxation under I. R. C. of 1939, § 22 (b) (3) (now I. R. C. of 1954, § 102 (a)). I think the finding was not clearly erroneous and that the Court of Appeals was therefore wrong in reversing the District Court’s judgment. While conflicting inferences might have been drawn, there was evidence to show that Mr. Stanton’s long services had been satisfactory, that he was well liked personally and had given splendid service, that the employer was under no obligation at all to pay any added compensation, but made the $20,000 payment because prompted by a genuine desire to make him a “gift,” to award him a “gratuity.” Cf. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U. S. 243, 246-247 . The District Court’s finding was that the added payment “constituted a gift to the taxpayer, and therefore need not have been reported by him as income . . . The trial court might have used more words, or discussed the facts set out above in more detail, but I doubt if this would have made its crucial, adequately supported finding any clearer. For this reason I would reinstate the District Court’s judgment for petitioner.