explaining that "the allocation of the burden of proof," like many other legal devices that ordinarily pass constitutional muster, "cannot be applied in settings where they have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual the more reluctant to use it."
How later courts described this case
- explaining that "the allocation of the burden of proof," like many other legal devices that ordinarily pass constitutional muster, "cannot be applied in settings where they have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual the more reluctant to use it."
- stating that when a strict liability provision applies to First Amendment-related conduct, such a provision may “have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual the more reluctant to exercise it”
- holding that an anti-obscenity law “dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents of the book on the part of the seller” . . . tends to impose a severe limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally protected matter”
- holding unconstitutional a strict-liability ordinance preventing booksellers from possessing obscene books because it would cause each bookseller to “tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected [and as a result] the public’s access to reading matter would be restricted”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lavey v. City of Two Rivers, 994 F. Supp. 1019 (1998)
361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959) is inapposite.
Distinguished by Shoresman v. Burgess, 412 F. Supp. 831 (1976)
361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959), cited by plaintiffs as support for this assertion, is clearly distinguishable.
Distinguished by Engstrom v. Robinson, 317 F. Supp. 124 (1969)
Smith is distinguishable from the instant case in one regard.
Distinguished by City of Detroit v. Grimshaw, 17 Mich. App. 413 (1969)
While arguably Smith is distinguishable from the instant case because in the instant case the trial court inferred from the statute existence of a requirement of scienter, the Villano decision rejects such a distinction.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The striking down of local legislation is always serious business for this Court. In my opinion in the Roth case, 354 IT. S., at 503-508, I expressed the view that state power in the obscenity field has a wider scope than federal power. The question whether scienter is a constitutionally .required element in a criminal obscenity statute is *170 intimately related to the constitutional scope of the power to bar material as obscene, for the impact of such a requirement on effective prosecution may be one thing where the scope of the power to proscribe is broad and quite another where the scope is narrow. Proof of scienter may entail no great burden in the case of obviously obscene material; it may, however, become very difficult where the character of the material is more debatable. . In my view then, the scienter question involves considerations of a different order depending on whether a state or a federal statute is involved. We have here a state ordinance, and on the meagre data before us I would not reach the question whether the absence of a scienter element renders the ordinance unconstitutional. I ■ must say, however, that the generalities in the Court’s opinion striking down the ordinance leave me unconvinced.
. From the point of view of the free dissemination of constitutionally protected ideas, the Court invalidates the ordinance on the ground that its effect may be to induce booksellers to restrict their offerings of nonobscene literary merchandise through fear of prosecution for unwittingly having on their shelves an obscene publication. From the point of view of the State’s interest in protecting its citizens against the dissemination of obscene material, the Court in effect says that proving the state of a man’s mind is little more difficult than proving the state of his digestion, but also intimates that a relaxed standard of mens rea would satisfy constitutional requirements. This is for me too rough a balancing of the competing interests at stake. Such a balancing is unavoidably' required in this kind of constitutional adjudication, notwithstanding that it arises in the domain of liberty of speech and press. A more critical appraisal of both sides of the constitutional balance, not possible on the meagre material before us, *171 seems to me required before the ordinance can be struck down on this ground. For, as the concurring opinions of my Brothers Black and Frankfurter show, the conclusion that this ordinance, but not one embodying some element of scienter, is likely to restrict the dissemination of legitimate literature seems more dialectical than real.
1 am also not persuaded that the ordinance in question was unconstitutionally applied in this instance merely because of the state court’s refusal to admit expert testimony. ■ I agree with my Brother Frankfurter that the trier of an obscenity case must take into account “contemporary community standards,” Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 489 . This means that, regardless of the elements of the offense under state law, the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a. conviction such as was obtained here 1 unless the work complained of is found substantially to exceed the limits of candor set by contemporary community standards. 2 The community cannot, where liberty of speech and press are at issue, condemn that which it generally tolerates. This being so, it follows that due process — “using that term in its primary sense of an opportunity to be heard and to defend [a] .”. . substantive right,” Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 , 678—requires a State to allow a liti *172 gant in some manner to introduce proof on this score. While a State is not debarred from regarding the trier of fact as the embodiment of community standards, competent to judge a challenged work against those standards, 3 it is not privileged to rebuff all efforts to enlighten or persuade the trier.
However, I would not hold that any particular kind of evidence must be admitted, specifically, that the Constitution requires that oral opinion testimony by experts be heard. There áre other ways in which proof can be made, as this very case demonstrates. Appellant attempted to compare the contents of the work with that of other allegedly similar publications which were openly published, sold and purchased, and which received wide general acceptance. Where there is a variety of means, even though it may be considered that expert testimony is the most convenient and practicable method of proof, I think it is going too far to say that such á method is constitutionally compelled, and that a State may not conclude, for reasons responsive to its traditional doctrines of evidence law, that the issue of community standards may not be the subject of expert testimony. I know of no case where this Court, on constitutional grounds, has required a State to sanction a particular mode of proof.
In my opinion this conviction is fatally defective in that the trial judge, as I read the record, turned aside every' attempt by appellant to introduce evidence bearing oh community standards. The exclusionary rulings were not limited to offered expert testimony. This had the effect of depriving appellant of the opportunity to offer any proof on a constitutionally relevant issue. On this ground I would reverse the jüdgment below, and remand the case for a new trial.
We are concerned in this instance with an objection to what a book portrays, not to what it teaches. Cf. Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684 .
The most notable expression of this limitation is that of Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 , 121: '“If there be no abstract definition, . . . should not the word 'obscene’ be allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived here and now?” See also the exposition of this view in American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (Tentative Draft No. 6), at p. 30. It may be that the Roth case embodies this restriction, see 354 U. S., at 487, n. 20 ; but see id., at 499-500 (separate opinion).
Such a view does not of course mean that the issue is to be tried according to the personal standards of the judge or jury.