Heflin v. United States

Me. Justice Stewart,

whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Whittaker join, concurring.

While joining the Court’s opinion, I think it clear that a motion for relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 is available only to attack a sentence under which a prisoner is in custody. That is what the statute says. That is what the legislative history shows. That is what federal courts, faced almost daily with the statute’s application, have unanimously concluded. Personal notions as to the kind of a post-conviction statute that Congress might have enacted or should enact are, of course, entirely irrelevant to the inquiry.

First. The words which Congress has used are not ambiguous. Section 2255 provides that: “A prisoner in custody under sentence . . . claiming the right to be released . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” The statute further provides: “A motion for such relief may be made at any time.” This latter provision simply means that, as in habeas corpus, there is no statute of limitations, no res judicata, and that the doctrine of laches is inapplicable.

Second. The legislative history of § 2255 is reviewed at length in the opinion which Mr. Chief Justice Vinson wrote for the Court in United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205 . No chronicle of the genesis and purpose of a legislative enactment could be more authentic, because almost the entire legislative history is to be found in the deliberations and recommendations of the Judicial Con *421 ference of the United States, over which Mr. Chief Justice Vinson then presided. The opinion in Hayman clearly shows that “the sole purpose” of the statute “was to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in another and more convenient forum.” 342 U. S., at 219 . Those difficulties are detailed in the opinion. There is not one word to indicate any intent to alter the basic principle of habeas corpus that relief is available only to one entitled to be released from custody.

The very office of the Great Writ, its only function,,is to inquire into the legality of the detention of one in custody. It is unnecessary to paraphrase here Mr. Justice Stone’s penetrating discussion in McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131 , or to incorporate the thorough review of legal history there contained. It will suffice to note only the Court’s conclusion: “Without restraint of liberty, the writ will not issue. Equally, without restraint which is unlawful, the writ may not be used. A sentence which the prisoner has not begun to serve cannot be the cause of restraint which the statute makes the subject of inquiry.” (Citations omitted.) 293 U. S., at 138 .

Third. It is something of an understatement simply to say that these views are “shared by several Courts of Appeals.” So far as I have been able to find, these courts, at least since the Hayman decision, have been unanimous in holding that a motion under § 2255 may be filed only by a prisoner claiming the right to be released. These are the courts continually faced with problems arising under § 2255, and many of them have given careful consideration to this very issue. United States v. Bradford, 194 F. 2d 197 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. McGann, 245 F. 2d 670 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States ex rel. Bogish v. Tees, 211 F. 2d 69, 71 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Fooshee v. United States, 203 F. 2d 247 (C. A. 5 th Cir.); Duggins v. United *422 States, 240 F. 2d 479 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Juelich v. United States, 257 F. 2d 424 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Oughton v. United States, 215 F. 2d 578 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Williams v. United States, 236 F. 2d 894 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Hoffman v. United States, 244 F. 2d 378 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Toliver v. United States, 249 F. 2d 804 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Miller v. United States, 256 F. 2d 501 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Smith v. United States, 259 F. 2d 125 (C. A. 9th Cir.).

Although believing that relief in this case was not available under § 2255, I think, and indeed the Government concedes, that relief was available to the petitioner by virtue of Rule 35 of the Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. That rule provides: “The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” The rule became effective more than two years before the enactment of § 2255 and has an entirely different history. It was a codification of existing law and was intended to remove any doubt created by the decision in United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 67 , as to the jurisdiction of a District Court to correct an illegal sentence after the expiration of the term at which it was entered. *

Whether Rule 35 covers the broader field of collateral attack where a hearing to consider matters dehors the record is necessary, we need not here determine. The Rule certainly covers a case like the present one where the claim is that the sentence imposed was illegal on its face. For this reason, and because I agree with the Court’s construction of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, I concur in the opinion and the judgment.

See Judge Shackelford Miller’s discussion of the relationship between § 2255 and Rule 35 in Duggins v. United States, 240 F. 2d 479 (C. A. 6th Cir.).