explaining that the Admiralty Clause “empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive law ‘inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ [ ] to continue the development of this law within constitutional limits[,]” and “empowered Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits of the Constitution”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the Admiralty Clause “empowered the federal courts in their exercise of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction which had been conferred on them, to draw on the substantive law ‘inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ [ ] to continue the development of this law within constitutional limits[,]” and “empowered Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits of the Constitution”
- holding that the district court had pendent jurisdiction to consider maintenance and cure claims brought “by a complaint at law rather than by a libel in admiralty” because the complaint also alleged a Jones Act violation, which was within the district court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
- holding that the district court had pendant jurisdiction to consider maintenance and cure claims brought "by a complaint at law rather than by a libel in admiralty" because the complaint also alleged a Jones Act violation, which was within the district court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
- holding, inter alia, that federal courts do not have federal question jurisdiction over general maritime claims because such claims do not "arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled implicitly by Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) — not on the Supreme Court's list
858 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959) was overruled sub silentio by State of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972) is rejected.
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. — not on the Supreme Court's list
358 U.S. 354, 379, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990).
Supreme Court of the United StatesNov 6, 19902 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gautreau v. Central Gulf Steamship Corporation, 255 F. Supp. 615 (1966)
While Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959), involved several defendants, the case is clearly distinguishable from the present one.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting.
Although this case has aroused much discussion about the scope of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 ,1 cannot feel that the issue is either complex or earth-shaking. The real core of the jurisdictional controversy is whether a few more seamen can have their suits for damages passed on by federal juries instead of judges. For the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Brennan here and by Judge Magruder in Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F. 2d 834, 839 , I believe that federal jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 lies and a federal jury trial is proper. In particular I feel that technical or esoteric readings should not be given to congressional language which is perfectly understandable in ordinary English.
Much the same reason leads me also to dissent from Part II of the Court's opinion. By its terms the Jones Act applies to “any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment.” 41 Stat. 1007 , 46 U. S. C. § 688 . (Italics added.) This Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571 , held that the words “any seaman” did not include foreign seamen sailing foreign ships and injured in foreign waters. I dissented from that holding. It was based, I thought, on the Court’s concepts of what would be good or bad for the country *389 internationally rather than on an actual interpretation of the language of the Jones Act. Thus, it seemed to me that the Lauritzen holding rested on notions of what Congress should have said, not on what it did say. Such notions, weak enough in Lauritzen , seem much weaker still in this case where the tort involved occurred in our own waters. I cannot but feel that, at least as to torts occurring within the United States, Congress knew what it was doing when it said “any seaman” and I must dissent from today’s further and, I believe, unjustifiable reduction in the scope of the Jones Act. Moreover since the tort occurred in the navigable waters of the United States, I think the complaint against Compania Trasatlántica stated a good cause of action under general maritime law whether jurisdiction of the cause is based, as I believe, on 28 U. S. C. § 1331 , or, as the Court assumes, on some theory of “pendent jurisdiction.”
Mr. Justice Douglas joins in the first paragraph of this opinion. He believes that Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571 , is inapposite to the present case, because of the numerous incidents connecting this transaction with the United States. He therefore agrees with Mr. Justice Black that the District Court should take jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim against Compania Trasatlántica.