finding confession involuntary where “a mentally dull 19-year-old youth” was arrested without a warrant, not advised of his rights to remain silent or to counsel, held for three days without counsel or an advisor, prohibited from making a phone call, denied food for long periods of time and told by the chief of police that if he confessed, the police would attempt to protect him from an angry mob
How later courts described this case
- finding confession involuntary where “a mentally dull 19-year-old youth” was arrested without a warrant, not advised of his rights to remain silent or to counsel, held for three days without counsel or an advisor, prohibited from making a phone call, denied food for long periods of time and told by the chief of police that if he confessed, the police would attempt to protect him from an angry mob
- finding confession involuntary where teenage suspect had been held for three days without Miranda warnings, a hearing or access to counsel; had been denied food for long periods of time; and was told by police that they would protect him from likely mob violence if he confessed
- holding that defendant's confession was coerced when, among other factors, chief of police told defendant "that there would be 30 or 40 people there in a few minutes that wanted to get him" and defendant immediately confessed to avoid threat of mob violence
- holding that a confession was unconstitutionally coerced because the interro- gating police officer had promised that if the accused confessed, the officer would protect the accused from an angry mob outside the jail- house door
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list
356 U.S. 560, 561, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (finding confession involuntary where “a mentally dull 19-year-old youth” was arrested without a warrant, not advised of his rights to remain silent or to counsel, held for three days without counsel or an advisor, prohibited from making a phone call, denied food for long periods of time and told by the chief of police that if he confessed, the police would attemp…
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
I join in the reversal of the judgment in this case because the Police Chief's testimony, quoted in footnote 10 of the Court’s opinion, seems to me to require acceptance of petitioner’s claim that his confession was induced through fear of mob violence.
Mr. Justice Burton, on this record, would accept the conclusion of the state court and jury that petitioner’s confession was voluntary. Therefore, he would affirm the judgment rendered. See his dissent in Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155, 165 .