explaining that when a jury has been instructed on two legal theories, one of which is legally inadequate, the conviction must be reversed if it is not possible to determine whether the jury convicted on the legally adequate, or inadequate, theory
How later courts described this case
- explaining that when a jury has been instructed on two legal theories, one of which is legally inadequate, the conviction must be reversed if it is not possible to determine whether the jury convicted on the legally adequate, or inadequate, theory
- stating that “we think the proper rule to be applied is that which requires a verdict to be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected”
- holding that a conviction must be reversed if the evidence in the record supports a legally impermissible ground as well as a legally permissible one and "it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected"
- holding that there is constitutional error when two different theories are submitted to a jury that returns a general verdict of guilty and at least one of the theories was legally insufficient
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 167, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 14, 1978190 citing opinionsother groundsofficial confidenceRead itOverruled in part, on other grounds by Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985)
354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957) (“[W]e think the proper rule to be applied is that which requires a verdict to be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 473 U.S. 1
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Taylor, 126 Haw. 205 (2011)
" However, Yates is inapposite because it considered alternative theories of guilt offered in support of a single charge.
Distinguished by Smith v. Ryan, 220 F. App'x 563 (2007)
Yates, therefore, is inapposite.
Distinguished by United States v. Fred Fuchs and Roy D. Reagan, 218 F.3d 957 (2000)
The dissent contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Yates is inapplicable here.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Burton,
concurring in the result.
I agree with the result reached by the Court, and with the opinion of the Court except as to its interpretation of the term “organize” as used in the Smith Act. As to that, I agree with the interpretation given it by the Court of Appeals. 225 F. 2d 146 .
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.