holding that Section 301(a) of the Labor Management and Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a) not only grants jurisdiction over defined areas of labor law but also vests in the courts the power to develop a common law of labor-management relations within that jurisdiction
How later courts described this case
- holding that Section 301(a) of the Labor Management and Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a) not only grants jurisdiction over defined areas of labor law but also vests in the courts the power to develop a common law of labor-management relations within that jurisdiction
- holding that, because collective bargaining agreements require uniform interpretation, federal law based on "the policy of our national labor laws” must substitute for state law
- holding that when Congress passed § 301(a) it “adopted a policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes, by implication rejecting the common-law rule” and requiring courts to fashion federal law from national labor policy
- holding that Section 301(a) of the Labor Management and Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185(a
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Jackson v. Illinois Laborers' & Contracting Training Trust Fund, 827 F. Supp. 2d 868 (2011)
The Plaintiff claims that Lincoln Mills is inapplicable because that case is not analogous to an action by a freestanding employee and her attorney seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement.
Distinguished by Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n Local 15 v. Law Fabrication, LLC, 237 F. App'x 543 (2007)
353 U.S. 448, 456, 77 S.Ct. 912, 918, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957), those cases are inapposite.
Distinguished by Ducos v. Maldonado, 207 F. Supp. 271 (1962)
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 is inapposite here because it was an action between a labor organization and an employer, specifically authorized by Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (a).
Distinguished by Bloomer Bros. v. Smith, 20 Misc. 2d 345 (1959)
The case relied upon by the Union, to wit, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills (353 U. S. 448), is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Burton,
whom Mr. Justice Harlan joins,
concurring in the result.
This suit was brought in a United States District Court under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of *460 1947, 61 Stat. 156 , 29 U. S. C. § 185 , seeking specific enforcement of the arbitration provisions of a collective-bargaining contract. The District Court had jurisdiction over the action since it involved an obligation running to a union — a union controversy — and not uniquely personal rights of employees sought to be enforced by a union. Cf. Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U. S. 437 . Having jurisdiction over the suit, the court was not powerless to fashion an appropriate federal remedy. The power to decree specific performance of a collectively bargained agreement to arbitrate finds its source in § 301 itself, 1 and in a Federal District Court’s inherent equitable powers, nurtured by a congressional policy to encourage and enforce labor arbitration in industries affecting commerce. 2
I do not subscribe to the conclusion of the Court that the substantive law to be applied in a suit under § 301 is federal law. At the same time, I agree with Judge Magruder in International Brotherhood v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F. 2d 576 , that some federal rights may necessarily be involved in a § 301 case, and hence that the constitutionality of § 301 can be upheld as a congressional grant to Federal District Courts of what has been called “protective jurisdiction.”
See the dissent of Judge Brown in the Court of Appeals in this case, 230 F. 2d 81, 89 .