holding that a limitations period on claims against the United States -13- 13 federal district courts have permitted equitable tolling of the limitations period in section 6511(a) or (b)(2)(A
How later courts described this case
- holding that a limitations period on claims against the United States -13- 13 federal district courts have permitted equitable tolling of the limitations period in section 6511(a) or (b)(2)(A
- finding that Congress, in creating the Court of Claims, restricted that Court’s jurisdiction by, among other things, specifically limiting suits to those “within six years after such claim first accrues”
- explaining that “this Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied”
- holding that accrual of takings claim was not postponed by the availability of an Army Claims Service remedy where Congress “ha[d] not so restricted the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1991) — not on the Supreme Court's list
The Court in Irwin overruled Soriano, and clarified that limitations principles apply to the government “in the same way” as they are applied to private parties, e.g., they may be tolled or waived in appropriate circumstances.
Supreme Court of the United StatesJan 22, 19912 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by Loy Ree B. Marlowe Ballam v. The United States, 806 F.2d 1017 (1986)
The ordinary claim case such as Soriano, supra, is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concur, dissenting.
If petitioner had sued in the Court of Claims without first presenting his claim to the Army Claims Service, I *278 think the Court of Claims would have been warranted in dismissing it. The Army Claims Service was established April 7, 1945, by General Douglas Mac Arthur to process claims such as this one. The Army Claims Serv-vice questioned whether expenses incurred by guerrilla organizations could be paid out of the appropriated funds. On August 6, 1945, General MacArthur advised the Army Claims Service that it could authorize the payment of claims such as this one. That directive stated:
“. . . The United States Army will assume the responsibility for paying certain claims arising out of activities of guerrilla forces in the Philippines. That responsibility will be limited to claims for the value of goods or services essential for carrying on operations against the enemy.
“. . . No payments will be made on claims arising out of activities of other than recognized guerrilla forces.
“. . . Such claims will be paid from the appropriation, ‘Expenses, Army of the Philippines’.
“. . . Payment will be made only on claims where there was a clear understanding at the time the supplies and equipment or services were purchased or contracted for that payment would eventually be made. There must have been a clear intention on the part of the guerrilla commander and of the vendor or employee that an obligation was being created. It must be definitely shown that the provision of such supplies, equipment or services was not intended as a patriotic donation to the common cause against the enemy. It must also be definitely shown that the supplies, equipment or services were essential for the operation of the guerrilla forces.”
*279 That directive was issued in accordance with the Act of July 3, 1945, 59 Stat. 401 -402, which appropriated money for “all expenses necessary for the mobilization, operation, and maintenance of the Army of the Philippines.” The expenditure and accounting were to be in the manner prescribed by the President. Id.., at 402. And the moneys were to be available to the Philippine Government “as authorized by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East.” Id., at 402 . The Government’s brief advises us that nearly $300,-000,000 was appropriated by the Congress for that purpose through July 3, 1945. And on February 18, 1946, $200,-000,000 more was added to that appropriation. 60 Stat. 14 .
The statutory scheme for payment of the expenses of the guerrilla forces, therefore, demonstrates that this claim, if it can be sustained on the merits, runs against the United States. The fact that approved claims were paid by the Philippine Government is a mere administrative detail. For it acted in this respect only as a disbursing agency for the United States.
Hence petitioner properly first presented his claim to the Army Claims Service, which rejected it June 21, 1948. The six-year statute should be held to run from that date. For it is the general rule that, where a claim must first be processed by an administrative agency, it does not accrue until the agency refuses payment. See United States v. Taylor, 104 U. S. 216, 222 . Cf. United States v. Clark, 96 U. S. 37, 43-44 .
That was the view of the Court of Claims in an earlier case involving such a problem. See Dino v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 307 . I think the Court of Claims position in the Dino case is the correct one.