stating that neither the Fifth Amendment, which provides that federal prosecutions for capital or otherwise infamous crimes must be instituted by presentments or indictments of grand juries, “nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must act”
How later courts described this case
- stating that neither the Fifth Amendment, which provides that federal prosecutions for capital or otherwise infamous crimes must be instituted by presentments or indictments of grand juries, “nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must act”
- recognizing that grand jury “indictment ... valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits”
- holding that defendant was not entitled to dismissal of indictment based on inadequacy or incompetence of evidence presented to grand jury
- holding that the courts lack the authority to invalidate indictments based on the inadequacy of the supporting evidence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Burton,
concurring.
I agree with the denial of the motion to quash the indictment. In my view, however, this case does not justify the breadth of the declarations made by the Court. I assume that this Court would not preclude an examination of grand-jury action to ascertain the existence of bias or prejudice in an indictment. Likewise, it seems to me that if it is shown that the grand jury had before it no substantial or rationally persuasive evidence upon which to base its indictment, that indictment should be quashed. To hold a person to answer to such an empty indictment for a capital or otherwise infamous federal crime robs the Fifth Amendment of much of its protective value to the private citizen.
Here, as in Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 , substantial and rationally persuasive evidence apparently was presented to the grand jury. We may fairly assume that the evidence before that jury included much of the *365 testimony later given at the trial by the three government agents who said that they had testified before the grand jury. At the trial, they summarized financial transactions of the accused about which they were not qualified to testify of their own knowledge. To use Justice Holmes’ phrase in the Holt case, such testimony, standing alone, was “incompetent by circumstances” {supra, at 248), and yet it was rationally persuasive of the crime charged and provided a substantial basis for the indictment. At the trial, with preliminary testimony laying the foundation for it, the same testimony constituted an important part of the competent evidence upon which the conviction was obtained.
To sustain this indictment under the above circumstances is well enough, but I agree with Judge Learned Hand that “if it appeared that no evidence had been offered that rationally established the facts, the indictment ought to be quashed; because then the grand jury would have in substance abdicated.” 221 F. 2d 668, 677 . Accordingly, I concur in this judgment, but do so for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and subject to the limitations there expressed. See also, Notes, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 111 ; 65 Yale L. J. 390.