holding that absent clear Congressional intent, a defendant charged with transporting two women in interstate commerce at the same time could be charged with only one violation of the Mann Act, which criminalized transporting any woman in interstate commerce “for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose”
How later courts described this case
- holding that absent clear Congressional intent, a defendant charged with transporting two women in interstate commerce at the same time could be charged with only one violation of the Mann Act, which criminalized transporting any woman in interstate commerce “for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose”
- holding that the sirriultaneous transportatión of two women across state lines constituted one, not two, violations ot the Mann Act,. which Made it 'a crime to knowingly transPort "any woman or girr across state linea for immoral purposes; "any'' left the unit of prosecution ambiguous, so the rule of lenity applied
- holding that the possession of a firearm by a felon who was also an illegal drug user comprised a single offense
- explaining that the rule of lenity “means that if Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Iglehart v. State, 1992 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 159 (1992)
There being no reasonable ambiguity, the rule of lenity embraced in Bell and the other cases cited by the dissent is inapposite to the instant case.
Distinguished by United States v. Hart, 524 F. Supp. 381 (1981)
Thus, Bell is inapposite.
Distinguished by United States v. Allen Ray Johnson, 612 F.2d 843 (1979)
349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), is inapplicable because no statutory ambiguity conceals the intent of Congress.
Distinguished by State v. Meadors, 177 Mont. 100 (1978)
For the foregoing reasons, the Bell rule is inapplicable to this case.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Minton,
with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Reed join,
dissenting.
The statute does not seem ambiguous to me. Congress made it clear enough for me to understand that it was trying to help the States as far as it could to stamp out the degradation and debauchery of women by punishing those who engaged in using them for prostitution. The only way Congress could do that was to make it unlawful to use the channels of commerce to transport them. The statute provides that,
“Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution ....
“Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 36 Stat. 825 , 18 U. S. C. § 2421 .
To me the statute means that to transport one or more women or girls in commerce constitutes a separate offense as to each one. Congress had as its purpose the protection of the individual woman or girl from exploitation, and the transportation of each female was to be punished. It was not concerned with protection of the means of transportation. Surely it did not intend to make it easier if one transported females by the bus load. A construction of the statute that reaches that result does violence to its plain wording. That is what the District Court thought, that is what the Court of Appeals thought, and with that I agree, and would affirm.