recognizing that Hall Street overruled “manifest disregard of the law” as an independent basis for vacatur
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that Hall Street overruled “manifest disregard of the law” as an independent basis for vacatur
- recognizing that, even when the evidence is probative, the "overriding policy of excluding such evidence ... is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice"
- compelling arbitration despite a statutory grant of federal jurisdiction stating, “[tjhere is nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system ... would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled”
- noting that an Arbitrators’ award “may be made without explanation of their reasons 7 and without a complete record of their proceedings”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 193, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesMay 15, 1989108 citing opinionsother groundsofficial confidenceRead itOverruled — as noted by 3 later courts
In 1989, the Court expressly overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989), holding that Wilko had been "incorrectly decided" as a result of the Wilko Court's outmoded suspicion of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes.
3 citing opinionsOverruled by Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
Wilko was overruled by Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L. Ed.2d 270 (1974), is incorrect as that case simply carved out a narrow exception to the
Overruled implicitly by Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that McMahon effectively overruled Wilko, and thus claims under § 12(2) of the Securities Act are arbitrable.
Questioned by Johnson v. O'BRIEN, 1988 Minn. App. LEXIS 318 (1988)
The continuing validity of the Wilko decision is questionable.
Questioned by Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 878 F.2d 729 (1989)
McMahon cast serious doubt on the continuing vitality of the Wilko rule that arbitration agreements covering Securities Act claims were unenforceable.
and 3 more.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1983)
346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953), argued that the arbitration clause was inapplicable to its securities claim.
Distinguished by Percy D. AYRES, Appellant, v. MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., 538 F.2d 532 (1976)
“[T]he policy considerations relied on by the Supreme Court in Wilko are inapposite here, the Supreme Court found that the non-waiver provision there involved was designed to protect investors. 346 U.S. at 431, 74 S.Ct. 182.
Distinguished by Lowry & Co. v. S. S. Nadir, 223 F. Supp. 871 (1963)
The case of Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953), relied upon heavily by libellant, is inapposite to the case at bar.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Jackson,
concurring.
I agree with the Court’s opinion insofar as it construes the Securities Act to prohibit waiver of a judicial remedy in favor of arbitration by agreement made before any controversy arose. I think thereafter the parties could agree upon arbitration. However, I find it unnec *439 essary in this case, where there has not been and could not be any arbitration, to decide that the Arbitration Act precludes any judicial remedy for the arbitrators’ error of interpretation of a relevant statute.