holding that the criminal provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act did not make a separate criminal offense of each underpayment of an employee, even though the Act’s civil liability provisions expressly recognized a right in each individual employee to maintain an action for restitution and damages
How later courts described this case
- holding that the criminal provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act did not make a separate criminal offense of each underpayment of an employee, even though the Act’s civil liability provisions expressly recognized a right in each individual employee to maintain an action for restitution and damages
- holding that because the offense made punishable under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a course of conduct, it is correct to read the statute as “treat[ing] as one offense all violations that arise from that singleness of thought, purpose or action, which may be deemed a single ‘impulse[.]’”
- holding that the defendant could only be charged once for multiple violations of one provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act because Congress only intended to punish "a course of conduct"
- describing the rationale behind the rule of lenity by saying, “when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Long, 169 F. Supp. 730 (1959)
Credit Corp., 1952, 344 U.S. 218, 73 S.Ct. 227, 231, 97 L.Ed. 260 is inapposite since the Court was there concerned with a non-penal regulatory statute which was construed as punishing “a course of conduct”.
Distinguished by United States v. Private Brands, Inc., and Francis P. Carey, 250 F.2d 554 (1958)
The cases relied upon, Ex parte Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 7 S.Ct. 556, 30 L.Ed. 658 and United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corporation, 344 U.S. 218, 73 S.Ct. 227, 97 L.Ed. 260, are readily distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
I think the question whether an employer has violated the criminal provisions of the Act is determined by reference to what he has done to a particular employee. The Act does not speak of “course of conduct.” That is the Court’s terminology, not the Act’s. The Act requires the employer to pay “each of his employees” not less than 75 cents an hour, prohibits him from employing “any of his employees” for more than 40 hours a week unless overtime is paid, and requires him to keep records of “the persons employed by him” and the wages, hours, etc. 29 U. S. C. §§ 206 , 207, 211 (c), as amended. And the Act makes it unlawful for an employer to violate “any of the provisions” of those sections. 29 U. S. C. §§215 , 216 (a).
It therefore seems clear to me that if an employer pays one employee less than 75 cents an hour or fails to pay overtime to one employee, or fails to keep the required records for one employee, a crime has been established, if scienter is shown. And it seems equally clear to me that if an employer wilfully fails to pay one employee the minimum wage, and wilfully fails to pay him the required overtime, and wilfully fails to keep the required records for him, three crimes have been committed. The crime is defined with reference to the individual employee. The crime may be a single, isolated act. It may or may not *227 be recurring or continuous. The violation may affect one employee one week or one month and another employee another week or another month; and it may affect one employee in one way, another employee in a different way. The violations may be continuous, and follow a set pattern; or they may be sporadic and erratic. The Act does not differentiate between them. Nothing is said about "course of conduct.” Perhaps a committee of Congress would be receptive to the suggestion now made. But it should be received there, not here. Of course, horrendous possibilities can be envisaged under almost every law. But the prosecutors who enforce this Act, the grand juries who hear the evidence on violations, and the District Courts who apply the sanctions have to date not made these criminal provisions oppressive and beyond reason. Yet until this case no court, so far as I can learn, has ever had the inventive genius to suggest that “course of conduct” rather than the “employee” is the unit of the crime.