explaining that if Congress intended statutory terms “to have other than their ordinarily accepted meaning, it would and should have given them a special meaning by definition”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that if Congress intended statutory terms “to have other than their ordinarily accepted meaning, it would and should have given them a special meaning by definition”
- explaining that if Congress intended statutory terms “to have other than their ordinarily accepted meaning, *622 it would and should have given them a special meaning by definition”
- “The Board is a statutory agency, and, when it is forbidden to investigate or entertain complaints in certain circumstances, its final order could hardly be valid.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting.
Congress, of course, could have exacted affidavits of nonmembership in Communist organizations from the officers of all local unions, of all nationals and internationals of which locals are constituents, and of all the federated organizations — i. e., the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L. — of which national and international organizations are members. To carry out such a purpose it could have been explicit. It could also have used some colloquially all-embracing term such as the phrase “national or international in scope” which it in fact did employ in § 10 (c) of the Act. Congress did not choose to express its will in either of these unequivocal forms. Instead it used the phrase “national or international labor organization.”
The fact that the phrase “national or international labor organization” consists of ordinary English words, which to the ordinary ear may carry a meaning different from that which they carry in the domain of industrial relations, does not destroy our duty to determine whether they do have a technical meaning when used in regard to matters of industrial relations. See the decision, per Holmes, J., in Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41, 48 . The Taft-Hartley Act is not an abstract document to be construed with only the aid of a standard dictionary. Its sponsors were familiar with labor organization and labor problems and it was doubtless drawn by specialists in *327 labor relations. If they used terms having a special meaning within the field, such words of art, in the absence of contrary indications, must be given that meaning.
The best source for us in determining whether a term used in the field of industrial relations has a technical connotation is the body to which Congress has committed the administration of the statute. Certainly, if there is no reasonable ground for rejecting the determination of the National Labor Relations Board, its view should not be rejected. We are advised by the Board that “national and international organization” is a term of art referring to the autonomous national and international organizations of workers which in federation constitute the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L. “We are familiar with no use of the term ‘national or international labor organization’ which includes parent federations such as the AFL or the CIO within its meaning. On the contrary, every definition or description of the structure of these two federations clearly indicates that the AFL and the CIO are different from ‘national’ or ‘international’ labor organizations.” Northern Virginia Broadcasters, Inc., 75 N. L. R. B. 11, 13. Nothing called to our attention has put in question this authoritative finding by the National Labor Relations Board. We ought not, therefore, to reject it.