noting that principles of comity generally require “that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter”
How later courts described this case
- noting that principles of comity generally require “that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter”
- noting 19 that comity “teaches that one court should defer actions on causes properly within its 20 jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already 21 cognizant of the litigation, have an opportunity to pass upon the matter”
- overruled in other respects, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-36, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963)
- overruled in other respects by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 105, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesMar 18, 196326 citing opinionsother groundsin partofficial confidenceRead itQuestioned — as noted by 3 later courts
sought and was denied certiorari here from the adverse decision of the New York Court of Appeals on his coram nobis application, and therefore the case does not necessarily draw in question the continued vitality of the holding in Darr v. Burford, [339 U.S. 200, 94 L.Ed. 761, 70 S.Ct. 5871, supra, that a state prisoner must ordinarily seek certiorari in this court as a precondition of applying for federal habeas corp…
3 citing opinionsin part
The opinion
Mr. Justice Burton,
with whom Mr. Justice Clark joins, concurs in the judgment and opinion of the Court, except for any indication it may contain that, although the reasons for a denial of certiorari are not stated, they nevertheless may be inferred from the record. He believes that the nature of the proceeding is such that, when the reasons for a denial of certiorari are not stated, the denial should be disregarded in passing upon a subsequent application for relief, except to note that this source of possible relief has been exhausted.