referring to the legislative history of the federal APA, which noted that a lack of separation of function between prosecutor and judge “not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness” (quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- referring to the legislative history of the federal APA, which noted that a lack of separation of function between prosecutor and judge “not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness” (quotation marks omitted)
- condemning the evil of commingling in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge
- invalidating hearings conducted by active members of the investigative branch of agency who might be required to examine witnesses and present evidence on behalf of the Government
- declining to consult legislative history when that “history is more conflicting than the text is ambiguous”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Marcello v. Bonds — not on the Supreme Court's list
339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950) (recognizing a constitutional need for a deportation hearing “at least for aliens who had not entered clandestinely and who had been here some time even if illegally”), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in, Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 133
Supreme Court of the United StatesMay 31, 19556 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Mr. Justice Reed,
dissenting.
The Court, it seems to me, has disregarded a congressional exemption of certain agencies, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, from some of the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Such judicial intrusion into the legislative domain justifies a protest. It may be useful to call attention to the necessity of recognizing specific exceptions to general rules. This protest is rested on the ground that immigrant inspectors performing duties under § 16 of the Immigration Act are within the exception provided by § 7 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court's opinion discusses this point under subdivision V. The sections are there set out and can be examined by the reader.
In this case no one questions the constitutionality of the hearing Wong received before the immigrant inspector, with administrative review by the Commissioner and the Board of Immigration Appeals. The question on which I disagree with the Court is whether the Administrative Procedure Act permits an inspector of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to serve as a presiding officer at a deportation hearing.
*54 Section 7 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that the official presiding at the taking of evidence shall be an agency, an agency member or an examiner appointed under that Act. There is an exception to this requirement. It reads as follows:
“but nothing in this Act shall be deemed to supersede the conduct of specified classes of proceedings in whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially provided for by or designated pursuant to statute.”
It is this exception that made it proper for an immigrant inspector to preside at this deportation hearing.
Under § 16 of the Immigration Act, 39 Stat. 874 , 885, the
“inspection ... of aliens, including those seeking admission or readmission to or the privilege of passing through or residing in the United States, and the examination of aliens arrested within the United States under this Act, shall be conducted by immigrant inspectors, .... Said inspectors shall have power to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence touching the right of any alien to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United States, and, where such action may be necessary, to make a written record of such evidence; . . . .”
It seems to me obvious that the exception provided in § 7 (a) covers immigrant inspectors dealing with the arrest of an alien for violation of the Immigration Act. The examination of arrested aliens at a deportation proceeding is surely a specified class of proceedings under § 7 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, and it is surely conducted by an officer “specially provided for by . . . statute.”
The reason for the exception in § 7 (a) was not spelled out in the legislative history or in the Act itself. The *55 exception may have been made to retain smoothness of operation in the several agencies where there were officials specially provided for by statute or designated pursuant to a statute. When making exceptions from the requirements as to separation of the investigatory and adjudicatory functions, it was natural to include officers specially designated by statute to sit in judgment. Agency members are excluded from these requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. They, too, have investigatory and adjudicatory duties. Since the members of the agency and the statutorily designated officers were specially selected for the functions they were to perform, Congress probably reposed confidence in their experience and expertness. It doubtless did not wish to disorganize administration until time showed whether that confidence was well placed. 1
Since the Court does not accept my view of the reach of § 7 (a), it would be useless to undertake an analysis of the other questions presented by the petition for certiorari.
Thus the congressional committee warned that should the exception “be a loophole for avoidance of the examiner system in any real sense, corrective legislation would be necessary. That provision is not intended to permit agencies to avoid the use of examiners but to preserve special statutory types of hearing officers who contribute something more than examiners could contribute and at the same time assure the parties fair and impartial procedure.” S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 216.