recognizing that “[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — to [a sentencing judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics” and “concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to the restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to a trial”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — to [a sentencing judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics” and “concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to the restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to a trial”
- concluding that a sentencing judge‘s ―broad discretionary power‖ in reviewing information in making a sentencing decision, including reviewing out-of-court information, does not violate the federal Due Process Clause and reasoning that ―modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain [all] pertinent information‖
- stating that the Court took no position on the effect of the decision on the Guidelines, but quoting the observation in Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515, 118 S.Ct. 1475, 140 L.Ed.2d 703 (1998), that “petitioners’ statutory and constitutional claims would make a difference if it were possible to argue, say, that the sentences imposed exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit.”
- holding that "modern" practice of acquiring sentencing information through probation agents does not offend the Confrontation Clause, and observing that "most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled — as noted by a later court — not on the Supreme Court's list
The view, once prevalent, that the procedural requirements applicable to capital sentencing are no more rigorous than those governing noncapital sentencing decisions, see, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 217, 91 S.Ct. at 1472; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 251-52, 69 S.Ct. at 1085, is no longer valid.
unconfirmed confidenceReported superseded by statute, as recognized in Barber v. Thomas — not on the Supreme Court's list
337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 482
Questioned by Askari Abdullah Muhammad v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 733 F.3d 1065 (2013)
The view, once prevalent, that the procedural requirements applicable to capital sentencing are no more rigorous than those governing noncapital sentencing decisions, see, e.g., Williams, 337 U.S. at 251-52, 69 S.Ct. at 1085, is no longer valid.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), and distinguished in Blakely
The opinion
Mr. Justice Murphy,
dissenting.
A combination of factors in this case impels me to dissent.'
Petitioner was convicted of murder by a jury, and sentenced to death by the judge. The jury which heard the *253 trial unanimously recommended life imprisonment as a suitable punishment for the defendant. They had observed him throughout the trial, had heard all the evidence adduced against him, and in spite of the shocking character of the crime of which they found him guilty, were unwilling to decree that his life should be taken. In our criminal courts the jury sits as the representative of the community; its voice is that of the society against which the crime was committed. A judge, even though vested with statutory authority to do so, should hesitate indeed to increase the sé verity of such a community expression.
He should be willing to increase it, moreover, only with the most scrupulous regard for the rights of the defendant. The record before us indicates that the judge exercised his discretion to deprive a man of his life, in reliance on material madp available to him in a probation report, consisting almost entirely of évidence that would have been inadmissible at the trial. Some, such ás allegations of prior crimes, was irrelevant. Much was incompetent as hearsay. All was damaging, and none was subject to scrutiny by the defendant.
Due process of law includes at least the idea that a person accused of crime shall be accorded a fair hearing through all the stages of the proceedings against him. I agree with the Court t.s to the value and humaneness of liberal use of probation reports as developed by modern penologists, but, in a capital case, against the unanimous recommendation of a jury,- where the report would concededly not have been admissible at the trial, and was not subject to examination by the defendant, I am forced to conclude that the high commands of due process were not obeyed.